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ABSTRACT
RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND PERSISTENCE:
THE ROLE OF STATE ORIENTATION AND GOAL ATTAINABILITY
Joe Ammar, MA
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Larissa K. Barber, Director
The action control literature suggests that individual differences in state orientation
predict how people respond to goal frustration. Research suggests that state orientation is
associated with misguided persistence. Though action control theorists suggest state-orientation
can be adaptive under some circumstances, there is a lack of research exploring the relationship
between state-orientation and persistence in different contexts. The current project bridges
research in action control and self-regulation to investigate variables that may influence the
relationship between state orientation and persistence. Based on theories of self-regulation and
resource allocation, I explored the relationship between state orientation and persistence in
single-goal and multiple-goal conditions in terms of self-regulation failure. Based on the
personality systems interaction theory, I explored whether the relationship between state
orientation and persistence differs based on attainability. I also investigated a potential three-way
interaction between state orientation, goal attainability, and resource allocation in predicting
persistence outcomes. I found evidence that need for resource allocation was associated with
persistence (β = -.19, p = .010). However, I did not find support for my other hypotheses. The
results from this study warrant further exploration into need for resource allocation in predicting
persistence outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Isaac Newton is often referred to as the most influential scientist of all time. Newton was
known to obsess over a problem until he reached a satisfactory solution. His brilliance and
persistence led to many key contributions in the fields of science and mathematics, including the
creation of modern calculus. However, his tenacity may also explain some of his less fruitful
endeavors, such as a lifelong pursuit of the Philosopher’s Stone (Dobbs, 1982)—a fictitious
substance thought to turn metal into gold. Research indicates that when the cost of persisting
towards a goal outweighs the benefits, it may be beneficial to disengage in order to pursue
valued alternatives (Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003). Doing so represents effective
resource allocation. Failing to disengage from some goals may lead to distress and negative
health outcomes (Miller & Wrosch, 2007; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003).
Given the negative effects described above, it is important to understand why some
people tend to persist in conditions when it may be best to disengage. State orientation may
provide one explanation. Research suggests that state orientation—an individual difference
variable—can affect persistence (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 1981). State-orientation refers
to a change-preventing mode of control associated with a fixation on current past or future states
(Kuhl, 1994a, 2000). State-oriented individuals are prone to prolonged single-minded goal
pursuit (Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004), even in situations in which disengagement is required
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for effective self-regulation (Jostmann & Koole, 2009). This tendency may be problematic in
situations that require resource allocation across multiple goals.
However, the unrelenting persistence during failure associated with state orientation can
be beneficial in circumstances that do not require resource allocation (Aspinwall & Richter,
1999; Koole et al., 2005). According to Tyson (2005), Newton faced a dilemma when his
calculations indicated that the orbits in the solar system should be unstable. Instead of further
exploring this problem, he attributed the order of the solar system to divine intervention. Had he
persisted instead of giving up, he may have found the solution that Laplace reached a century
later.
Although action control theorists suggest that state orientation can be adaptive under
certain circumstances (Koole et al., 2005), few studies have explored this possibility in terms of
persistence. This study examines whether state orientation uniformly leads to more persistence
across resource allocation tasks. Alternatively, I test the possibility that the effect of state
orientation only affects persistence when resource allocation is needed. my research design will
conceptually replicate the findings of Aspinwall and Richter (1999), which demonstrate that
individual differences can predict persistence depending on the presence or absence of
alternative tasks (need for resource allocation).
In addition, I explore how a situational characteristic—goal attainability —might
influence the relationship between state orientation and persistence under different resource
allocation conditions. In pursuing this goal, the current study draws from theories related to selfregulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver, 2003; Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2009;
Grawitch, Barber, & Justice, 2010), action control (Kuhl, 1981, 1994b), and personality systems
interaction theory (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004, 2008).
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Additionally, this study examines the interplay of state orientation, goal attainability, and
need for resource allocation on persistence. Given that those high in state orientation individuals
tend to persist longer on a failure task due to an unwillingness to disengage (Jostmann & Koole,
2009; Kuhl, 1981), greater obstacles to goal attainment may prompt persistence among those
higher in state orientation, which in some instances may be indicative of self-regulatory success
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). This kind of research, connecting personality predictors of
persistence and environmental predictors of persistence, is important for understanding potential
variables that influence direction of effort and for helping to improve the methodology of future
studies that incorporate persistence.

.

CHAPTER 2
STATE ORIENTATION, PERSISTENCE, AND SELF-REGULATION FAILURE
Persistence can be maladaptive. Here’s an example. Imagine a scenario in which two
students, Aaron and Nabeel, take a math test on the same day. Both have equal ability and come
equally prepared for the examination. Test questions appear in one of three sections. One of
these sections is especially difficult because it includes material not covered in the course.
However, each section is worth the same amount of points. Aaron and Nabeel encounter the
difficult section of problems first. The best strategy for success entails skipping the difficult
section to work on the easier questions that appear in the later sections. After answering a few
items, both students realize that they are making inadequate progress on the difficult initial test
section. Nabeel fixates on fully completing the difficult section and continues to work on it at the
expense of moving on to the easier sections. Alternatively, Aaron quickly realizes that he’s not
making progress on the difficult section, and thus moves on to the easier sections. Nabeel ends
up failing the exam while Aaron was able to solve enough problems to get a B.
Why did Aaron and Nabeel respond differently to the structure of the test? Research
suggests that Aaron and Nabeel may differ on key individual differences that predict the extent
to which they individuals persist (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Di
Paula & Campbell, 2002), leading to differences in disengagement. For example, Aaron may be
higher in positive beliefs, such as optimism and self-efficacy, than Nabeel. These characteristics
have been found to be linked to goal flexibility: People higher in these traits will disengage from
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tasks when it is appropriate to do so (Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Carver et al., 2010; Di Paula &
Campbell, 2002; McFarlin, 1985).
Of special interest in the present study is how individual differences related to actioncontrol—specifically threat-related state orientation—predicts persistence. Action-control theory
suggests that people respond to demanding situations by either being challenged and taking
initiative (action orientation) or by becoming threatened and hesitating (state orientation; Kuhl,
1984, 1994b, 2000).
Personality systems interaction theory is an extension of action-control theory that
combines motivational and cognitive perspectives in proposing systems relevant to goal setting
(Kuhl, 2000). This model suggests that state-oriented individuals are less able to switch
between these systems, leading to prolonged activation of self-control processes. This may lead
those high in state orientation to persist in situations in which doing so is counterproductive to
success (Jostmann & Koole, 2009). An implication of the extant literature is that those high in
state orientation are prone to self-regulation failure (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Koole et al.,
2014; Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004). Baumeister and Heatherton suggest that there are two
forms of self-regulation failure relevant to persistence: underregulation and misregulation
(1996).
However, there is an absence of research exploring the relationship between state
orientation and persistence in situations in which persistence is indicative of self-regulatory
success. The first of the next two sections will describe the relationship between state
orientation and persistence as it is specified by action control theory. The second section will
describe this relationship as it is specified by personality systems interactions theory. In the
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third section, I will explore the relationship between state orientation and persistence from
perspectives emphasizing self-regulation in resource allocation and self-regulation failure
(underregulation and misregulation).
Action Control
Action control theory suggests that there are two opposing regulatory modes that are used
to regulate actions (Koole & Fockenberg, 2011; Kuhl, 1984, 1994b). Action orientation is related
to a meta-static (change-inducing) mode of control that aids in enacting intentions. State
orientation, in contrast, is related to a catastatic (change-preventing) mode of control that hinders
the enactment of intentions (Kuhl, 2000). An action control scale was developed to assess a
tendency towards action or state orientation as an individual difference (Kuhl, 1994b). The most
studied dimensions of this scale are demand-related state orientation and threat-related state
orientation. Demand-related state orientation assesses how people tend to respond to demanding
situations. According to Jostmann and Koole (2009), a demanding situation is one in which an
individual ruminates about a goal they would like to attain and experiences reduced positive
affect and possible feelings of depression, weariness, or dissatisfaction. High state-oriented
scores on this subscale are associated with indecisiveness and hesitation (Diefendorff, Hall,
Lord, & Strean, 2000; Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Kuhl, 1994a). The threat-related subscale of
state orientation concerns how people respond to threatening conditions. According to Jostmann
and Koole (2009), a threatening condition is one in which an individual ruminates about a goal
they ought to attain and experiences increased negative affect, as well as possible feelings of
agitation, anxiety, or worry (Diefendorff et al., 2000; Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Kuhl, 1994b).
High state-oriented scores on this subscale are associated with preoccupation and rumination.
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Recent studies exploring persistence in terms of self-regulatory success suggest that state
orientation is associated with less persistence (Dang, Dewitte, Mao, Xiao, & Shi, 2013; Gröpel et
al., 2014; Koole, Jostmann, & Baumann, 2012). However, these studies focused on demandrelated state orientation. Theoretical developments in the action-control literature suggest that
threat-related state orientation and demand-related state orientation predict unique persistence
outcomes (Jostmann & Koole, 2009). Despite this, there is an absence of research exploring
threat-related state orientation and persistence in terms of self-regulatory success. According to
the personality systems-interaction theory, threat-related state orientation may predict greater
persistence outcomes (Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004, 2008)1.
Personality Systems Interaction Theory
Personality systems interaction theory proposes four systems that are important for goaldirected behavior: intention memory, intuitive behavioral control, object recognition, and
extension memory (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004, 2008). The
intention memory system maintains a goal intention in working memory. This system transfers
information to and from the intuitive behavioral control system, which is responsible for the
automatic processing of external and internal information and putting intentions into action. The
purpose of the objective recognition system is to single out objects outside of the context of
which they appear. This system interacts with the extension memory system, which looks at
objects in the way they relate broadly. PSI theory suggests that effective goal-related behavior
depends on the switching of and interaction between these systems according to situational

1

Given the focus of the present study, any further mention of action or state orientation will be
in reference to the threat-related dimension in particular.
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requirements, a process that depends on affect regulation (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 2000).
Increased negative affect and reduced positive affect activate systems related to self-control and
single-minded goal pursuit (objective recognition and intention memory) while blocking access
to and interaction between other systems essential for more holistic and automatic processing
(extension memory and intuitive behavioral control; Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004).
Developments in PSI theory suggest that the way in which individuals respond to failure
may predict persistence outcomes (Jostmann & Koole, 2009). Individuals confronted with
obstacles to goal pursuit may experience reduced positive affect and increased negative affect
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003;
Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003). According to PSI theory, negative affect triggers mental
systems related to self-control and single-minded goal pursuit (Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole,
2004). Those high in state orientation have trouble up-regulating positive affect and downregulating negative affect (Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Koole et al., 2008). For this reason, action
control theorists suggest that individuals high in state orientation tend to persist misguidedly
toward low progress goals (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Koole et al., 2014; Kuhl, 2000). Evidence
for this tendency is found in early studies linking state orientation with an inability to switch
from an unsolvable training task to a solvable task (Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985; Kuhl, 1981).
Personality systems interaction theory may explain why Nabeel persisted more than Aaron
on the difficult test section. Nabeel fixated on his low progress because he felt it was a negative
reflection of his ability level (regardless of his actual ability). According to Jostmann and Koole
(2004), ruminating about goals one ought to attain can lead to increased negative affect. The
authors conceptualize such conditions as threatening. During this process, Nabeel was unable to
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regulate the negative affect he was experiencing, resulting in the activation of the object
recognition and intention memory systems associated with single-minded goal pursuit. This led
him to fixate on each test item as an individual goal without reference to how performance on
each item related to the overall goal of achieving a high-test score. Nabeel’s response to this
threatening condition is typical of those high in state orientation. Aaron, however, was better
able to regulate affect during his low performance and was not pre-occupied by his low progress.
Because of this, systems related to single-minded goal pursuit (object recognition, intention
memory) were able to interact with systems related to holistic processing (extension memory,
intuitive behavioral control), allowing him to adapt to the conditions of the test and effectively
allocate effort between sections. This pattern is more reflective of individuals lower in state
orientation (i.e., action orientation).
Self-Regulation Failure and Need for Resource Allocation
Action control researchers often discuss the association between state orientation and
persistence in regards to situations in which it is better to disengage (Jostmann & Koole, 2009;
Koole et al., 2014, 2008; Kuhl, 1981). There is an absence of research investigating situations in
which the state orientation-persistence link may be beneficial. Different mechanisms of selfregulation suggest that persistence can be interpreted as effective or ineffective depending on
underregulation or misregulation processes. Underregulation is a disturbance in the selfregulatory system’s activity leading to an inability to perform up to a standard or goal.
Succumbing to the temptation to overeat whilst on a diet is an example of this type of selfregulation failure. In contrast, the self-regulatory system during misregulation is actively
exerting control toward the wrong goal in a manner that is counterproductive to a desired
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outcome (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1981). Attempting to suppress
unwanted thoughts is an example of misregulation because doing so may make those thoughts
more accessible (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Wegner & Erber, 1992). Whether
misregulation or underregulation is relevant in understanding persistence depends on the
situational context. Recent theoretical developments have led self-regulation researchers to
consider the need for resource allocation when interpreting persistence outcomes (Barber,
Grawitch, & Munz, 2012; Baumeister, 2014; Grawitch et al., 2010).
A resource allocation perspective suggests that high persistence is indicative of
misregulation in situations in which resources need to be allocated between multiple, competing
goals. According to the personal resource allocation framework (Grawitch et al., 2010),
responding to daily demands requires the allocation of resources from a limited pool. In such
situations, success depends on properly allocating resources between multiple goals. Spending
too many resources towards one goal at the cost of success at competing alternatives is an
example of ineffective resource allocation (misregulation). In the case of Aaron and Nabeel,
directing efforts towards the difficult section was counterproductive to overall success. Persisting
on difficult problems left Nabeel little time to finish subsequent sections of the exam.
Aspinwall and Richter (1998) investigated persistence on an unattainable task
(unsolvable anagrams) among participants based on the need for resource allocation (presence of
subsequent solvable tasks). All participants were presented with an unsolvable anagram task.
Some participants were also presented with two subsequent solvable tasks. All participants were
instructed to solve as many problems as they could within 20 min. I can conceptualize successful
completion of each task as separate goals. In the single task condition, participants had a single
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goal. The multiple tasks condition required participants to effectively allocate resources between
competing goals (successful completion of each task). As the first task was unsolvable,
maximizing performance outcomes entailed skipping the first task to focus on the subsequent
tasks. Persisting on the first task in these circumstances would be indicative of self-regulation
failure (misregulation). Aspinwall and Richter found that the presence of alternative tasks would
prompt an individual to move on from the initial (and unsolvable) set of anagrams. However,
some individuals persisted on the first task longer than others. PSI theory suggests that this may
have been due to differences in how well each individual was able to down-regulate the negative
affect prompted by poor performance during the first task (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 2000;
Kuhl & Koole, 2004, 2008). This explanation is supported by a replication that indicated that
participants who reported more anger during goal frustration were more likely to persist on
unsolvable problems (Lench & Levine, 2008). The extant literature suggests that those high in
state orientation are prone to single-minded goal persistence due to problems regulation affect
(Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Koole et al., 2014; Kuhl, 1981). Thus, those high in state orientation
would be more likely to persist on some goals at the expense of others. This coincides with a
misregulation perspective, which views self-regulation failure in terms of misguided direction of
effort (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996).
An implication of PSI theory is that state orientation is associated with misguided
persistence (misregulation; Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004).
However, there is an absence of research exploring whether those high in state orientation would
persist longer in single goal conditions that do not require resource allocation across multiple
goals. An underregulation perspective is appropriate in such conditions as it concerns the ability
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to exert control and does not take into account how one directs this control (Baumeister &
Heatherton, 1996). Underregulation occurs when one is unable or unwilling to reduce the
discrepancy between current behavior and a standard. Developments in PSI theory suggest that
state orientation is associated with prolonged activation of self-control processes during
frustrated goal pursuit. This may occur regardless of the need for resource allocation. From an
underregulation perspective, greater persistence in single-goal conditions may be indicative of
self-regulatory success. In addition, Aspinwall and Richter suggest that persisting can be an
adaptive response to goal frustration when there are no alternative competing goals (1999). In the
example of Nabeel and Aaron, greater persistence on the difficult section was indicative of selfregulation failure (misregulation) because it allowed for less time to be allocated to other
sections, making it counterproductive to overall success on the exam. Had the test only consisted
of the difficult section, Nabeel’s tenacity would have been indicative of self-regulatory success
from an underregulation perspective. In addition, he may have been rewarded with higher marks
for spending longer on difficult or seemingly unsolvable items.
The current project sets out to explore the relationship between state orientation and
persistence in terms of an underregulation perspective (single-task condition) and a
misregulation perspective (multiple-task condition). Based on developments in action control
theory and PSI theory, state-orientation is associated with single-minded goal pursuit (Jostmann
& Koole, 2009; Koole et al., 2014; Kuhl, 2000). I expect that state orientation will be positively
associated with persistence. Though action-control researchers often explore this relationship in
situations in which persistence is maladaptive, Baumeister and Heatherton’s model of selfregulation failure suggests that this association may be adaptive under certain contexts. For
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example, tenacity may pay off in a situation in which an individual is presented with a single
difficult problem. From an underregulation perspective, persisting under such conditions would
be indicative of self-regulatory success. However, directing effort toward a difficult problem
may be maladaptive when there are other problems that need to be solved. Developments in the
self-regulation literature suggest that best outcomes are achieved under these circumstances by
effectively directing effort between problems (Barber et al., 2012; Baumeister & Heatherton,
1996; Grawitch et al., 2010). From a misregulation perspective, an inability or unwillingness to
do so is indicative of self-regulation failure. I will explore these ideas through an experiment
based on the methodology used by Aspinwall and Richter (1999). Participants in my study will
engage in either one hard task or three tasks (one hard and two easier). I will interpret differences
in persistence based on state-orientation in terms of two types of self-regulation failure:
underregulation and misregulation. Based on the findings of Aspinwall and Richter (1998), I also
expect that individuals overall will persist less when there is a need for resource allocation (i.e.,
the multiple-task condition).

Hypothesis 1: State orientation is positively associated with persistence on the first task.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals in the resource allocation condition (presence of alternative
tasks) persist less on the first task than those in the non-resource allocation condition
(absence of alternative tasks).
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If state orientation is related to more persistence in general, only the interpretation of
persistence on the first task depends on if resource allocation is required or not. From an
underregulation perspective, the positive relationship between state orientation and persistence is
indicative of self-regulatory success when resource allocation is not required. That is, persistence
may be the best strategy in the absence of alternatives even when the desired outcome is
unattainable (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003).
Alternatively, the positive relationship between state orientation and persistence is indicative of
self-regulatory failure when resource allocation is required because there is a benefit to switching
to alternative tasks (Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003).
However, an alternative perspective is that state orientation is never beneficial, even
without the need to allocation resources. Action control theorists argue that state orientation is
associated with misguided persistence (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Koole et al., 2014). This is
because state-oriented individuals have trouble switching between mental systems related to goal
pursuit (Kuhl, 2000). In an early study, Kuhl found that state orientation was associated with
greater persistence on an unattainable training task when participants had the option to switch to
the actual task (1981). In the context of single-minded goal pursuit, researchers propose that
action-oriented individuals may even persist more than state-oriented individuals when faced
with high demand or threat (Jostmann & Koole, 2009). Evidence for this has been found in
studies assessing persistence on self-control tasks based on demand-related state orientation
subscale (Dang et al., 2013; Gröpel et al., 2014; Jostmann & Koole, 2007). Based on theory and
previous findings, an alternative hypothesis from the main proposed effect is that state-oriented
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individuals will persist less when there is no need for resource allocation (underregulation) and
persist more when there is a need for resource allocation (misregulation; see Figure 1).

Hypothesis 3: The need for resource allocation will moderate the relationship between
state orientation and persistence on the first task. Specifically, state orientation is
positively related to persistence when resource allocation is required (presence of
alternatives), but is negatively related to persistence when resource allocation is not
required (absence of alternatives).

Figure 1. Proposed moderation model.

CHAPTER 3
GOAL ATTAINABILIY
Thus far, I have discussed one individual difference variable (state orientation) and one
situational context (resource allocation required across multiple tasks) that may affect persistence
on tasks. However, another situational variable that may affect persistence is the attainability of a
goal during single- or multiple-task goal pursuit. That is, how would Aaron and Nabeel’s
behavior change depending on whether the difficult section was completely unworkable
(impossible to solve) or just merely difficult (but attainable)?
Studies investigating self-regulation failure often assess persistence on unsolvable tasks.
For example, of the design used in Aspinwall and Richter (1998) has a completely unattainable
goal (unsolvable anagrams) for single-goal pursuit and the first task of the multiple-goal pursuit
(followed by attainable subsequent goals in the multiple-task condition). Even when the tasks
utilized for self-regulation failure studies are similar, the degree to which the desired outcome is
attainable often differs (e.g., ratio of unsolvable to solvable problems; Burkley et al., 2011;
Ciarocco et al., 2001; Muraven et al., 2006, 1998; Segerstrom & Nes, 2007). Despite evidence
suggesting that persistence is influenced by goal attainability (Brehm & Self, 1989), there is an
absence of research exploring how this environmental variable interacts with individual
difference variables in predicting persistence outcomes. According to PSI theory, individual
differences in persistence based on state orientation scores occur because of an inability to
regulate affect during goal frustration (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 2000). This suggests that
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those high in state orientation may persist more when a goal is unattainable. This section will
explore the relationship between state orientation and persistence based on goal attainability. I
will also explore whether state orientation, goal attainability, and resource allocation interact to
predict persistence outcomes.

State Orientation and Goal Attainability
According to Carver and Scheier (1998), the expectation of a favorable outcome of goal
pursuit produces positive affect, whereas the expectation of an unfavorable outcome produces
negative affect. When a person is close to a desired outcome, positive affect prompts a reduction
of effort (coasting; Carver, 2004; Simon, 1967), allowing for resources to be directed toward
alternative goals (Carver & Scheier, 2009). Likewise, a large discrepancy between current
progress and a desired goal produces anger (Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2009), which prompts an
increase of effort (Levine, 1996).21 Normally, individuals eventually disengage when outcome
expectancy is unfavorable in order to conserve resources and avoid negative affect associated
with frustrated goal pursuit (Carver, 2003; Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2009; Wrosch, Scheier,
Miller, et al., 2003). However, individuals high in state orientation may persist more under these
circumstances (Koole et al., 2014). Research suggests that individual differences in persistence
are more pronounced following the experience of repeated failure rather than the experience of a
single failure (Di Paula & Campbell, 2002). In addition, those high in state orientation ruminate
more in response to conditions of repeated failure than to conditions of failure and success

1

Note: An alternative perspective not referenced in this manuscript suggests that persistence
increases as individuals get closer to a desired goal (Brendl & Higgins, 1996).
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(Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985). Thus, the relationship between state orientation and persistence on
a low progress goal may differ based on the attainability of that goal. Unattainable goals present
individuals with greater obstacles to success than attainable goals (Carver & Scheier, 1998;
Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003). Thus, greater negative affect is prompted during pursuit
of unattainable goals than attainable goals. Those high in state orientation may persist more in
these conditions because they have trouble to down-regulating negative affect (Jostmann &
Koole, 2009; Koole & Jostmann, 2004). According to PSI theory, negative affect produced by
obstacles to goal attainment activates mental systems related to single-minded goal pursuit
(Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004, 2008).
Returning to my two math students, Aaron outperformed Nabeel because he skipped over
the difficult section when he realized he was making low progress—a condition representing low
goal attainability. Nabeel had trouble regulate the negative affect he experienced while he
struggled on difficult problems. This led him to persist instead of moving on to other sections
that were higher in goal attainability. However, Nabeel may have persisted less if the difficult
section included a few easy problems. PSI theory suggests this is because he would have
experienced less negative affect due to goal frustration.
In the current study, I predict that goal attainability will moderate the relationship
between state orientation and persistence. The current study will investigate differences in
persistence based on the threat-related state orientation dimension, which is related to how
individuals respond to failure (Diefendorff et al., 2000; Kuhl, 1994b). I expect that state-oriented
individuals will persist more when presented with an unattainable goal due to increased exposure
to negative affect and repeated failure, both of which have been operationalized as threat in
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previous action-control research (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl,
1981). When there is no need for resource allocation, this prolonged persistence may be
indicative of self-regulatory success from an underregulation perspective (Baumeister &
Heatherton, 1996). However, this increase in persistence would be considered misregulation in
conditions requiring resource allocation (Barber et al., 2012). Thus, I predict that goal
attainability will moderate the relationship between state orientation and persistence (see Figure
2).

Hypothesis 4a: Goal attainability moderates the relationship between state orientation and
persistence. Specifically, the positive relationship between state orientation and
persistence is stronger when a goal is unattainable compared to when a goal is attainable.

Figure 2. Proposed moderation model.

However, an alternative perspective suggests that state orientation will be associated with
self-regulation failure in all conditions (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Koole et al., 2012). This is
due to issues related to affect regulation, resulting in hindered interaction between mental
systems related to goal pursuit (Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004, 2008). Though state
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orientation may be associated with increased persistence under certain circumstances (Koole et
al., 2005), action control theorists typically frame high persistence among those high in state
oriented in terms of a maladaptive response to high demand or threat (Jostmann & Koole, 2009;
Koole et al., 2014). Previous research indicates that action-orientated individuals persist more
when that is the only option, and are quicker to switch to another task when it is appropriate to
do so (Jostmann & Koole, 2007, 2009; Kuhl, 1981). In terms of single-minded goal pursuit,
multiple studies have found evidence for stronger depletion effects among state-oriented
compared to action-oriented individuals (Dang et al., 2013; Gröpel et al., 2014; Koole et al.,
2012). However, studies that have associated state orientation with lower persistence in a single
goal context have mainly focused on the demand-related state orientation subscale. Studies
exploring the threat-related state orientation subscale and persistence mainly concern situations
relevant to misguided persistence or misregulation (Jostmann & Koole, 2007, 2009; Koole et
al., 2014; Kuhl, 1981). Oddly, there is an absence of research exploring threat-related state
orientation from an underregulation perspective for circumstances in which prolonged
persistence is indicative of self-regulatory success. Action-control theorists suggest that state
orientation is positively associated with persisting during goal frustration only in situations in
which persistence is counterproductive to a desired outcome (Jostmann & Koole, 2007). This is
because those high in state orientation have trouble coping with high demand and threat
(Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 2000). Thus, when a goal is unattainable (greater threat), they
should persist less when there is no need for resource allocation and persist more when there is
a need for resource allocation. The proposed three-way interaction of the alternative hypothesis
is presented in Figure 3.
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Hypothesis 4b: There is a three-way interaction between state orientation, attainability,
and need for resource allocation in predicting persistence on the first task. When there is a need
for resource allocation, state orientation is positively related to persistence and this effect is
stronger with unattainable goals (consistent with a pattern of misregulation). When there is no
resource allocation needed, state orientation is negatively related to persistence and this effect is
stronger for unattainable goals (consistent with a pattern of underregulation).

Figure 3. Proposed moderated moderation model.

CHAPTER 4
METHOD
Participants
Participants were recruited from a Midwestern University for a two-part study testing
verbal abilities. I conducted a power analysis using G*Power (linear multiple regression, fixed
model, R2 increase) to estimate the amount of participants needed to detect a significant
increase in variance explained by the state orientation by Attainability x Resource allocation
interaction in predicting persistence. Based on Cohen’s suggestions for effect size as well as
practical considerations, I chose a small effect size of .05 (Cohen, 1977). Results indicated that
160 participants would be sufficient to detect significant results at p = .05, β = .20. Anticipating
some missing data, I aimed to oversample to 170 participants for recruitment. Due to an error, I
ended up with 201 participants. Participants who completed the survey twice or completed part
2 of the study prior to part 1 were removed (n = 18). This left us with a final sample of 183
participants. Of these participants, 95 were recruited from an introductory psychology course
and 88 were recruited from upper level psychology courses. Participant ages ranged from 18 to
61 (M = 21.93, SD = 4.09). The majority of participants were white (51.9%), female (73.8%),
and in their junior year of college (32.2%). Participants were compensated with extra credit
hours to be applied towards a psychology course at their professor’s discretion.
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Procedure
The current project was adapted from Aspinwall and Richter (1999). It consisted of two
parts: an online survey and an in lab session. Informed consent was sought in both sessions
regarding participation in an experiment testing verbal abilities. Participants completed the
online survey before the in-lab session. The survey consisted of items assessing action/state
orientation, optimism, trait self-control, as well as demographic information. Measures, as well
as items within each measure, appeared in random order for each participant. Demographic items
appeared last. After completion of the online survey, participants were prompted to sign up for
the in-lab session.
The current study utilized a 2 x 2 fully crossed factorial design with two levels for
resource allocation (single task, multiple tasks) and two levels of goal attainability (unattainable,
attainable). For the in-lab session, each participant was randomly assigned to one of four
conditions: single task-unattainable, single task-attainable, multiple tasks-unattainable, multiple
tasks-attainable.
Participants were told that their verbal abilities would be tested by solving anagrams.
Each participant was assigned to a computer with instructions to solve as many anagrams as they
could within 20 minutes. They were also told that they could end the experiment at any time.
Participants were provided paper to record their answers. All participants were presented with 10
anagrams. This was the only set presented to those in the two single-task (no resource allocation)
condition. Those in the multiple task condition (resource allocation) were also presented with
two additional subsequent solvable anagram tasks.
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Goal attainability was manipulated by adjusting the number of possible anagrams and
impossible anagrams presented on the first task. In the attainable condition, the first task
consisted of three possible anagrams followed by seven impossible anagrams. Similar to the
original design by Aspinwall and Richter (1999), the unattainable condition presented
participants with 10 impossible anagrams in the first task. The presence of alternative tasks
condition included 2 additional sets of 7 solvable anagrams, summing to 24 anagrams total. The
solvable problems consisted of anagrams pretested by Aspinwall and Richter to be of medium
difficulty (50-60% solvable rate). Participants in the resource allocation condition were allowed
to move on to subsequent sections but were not allowed to return to previous sections. In
accordance with the methodology of past studies using this design (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999;
Lench & Levine, 2008), participants in the presence of alternatives condition were told that each
set of anagrams measured a distinct verbal skill and that they may still do well in other sections if
they do poorly in one section. A manipulation check followed the first task in which participants
completed items assessing the extent to which they felt tense, apprehensive, annoyed, irritated,
anxious, angry, and competent during the task. Participants in the resource allocation condition
were asked to rate how different they believed subsequent tasks would be from the first.
Following study completion, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Study Materials
The current project sought to investigate how the relationship between state-orientation
and persistence differs in situations in persistence is beneficial compared to when it is
detrimental. Anagram tasks have been used in previous studies to assess behaviors indicative of
misregulation (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Lench & Levine, 2008; Randenborgh, Hüffmeier,
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LeMoult, & Joormann, 2010) and underregulation (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice,
1998; Muraven et al., 1998). Consistent with Aspinwall and Richter (1999), the current study
presented participants with unsolvable anagrams on the first task. However, the present study has
modified the first task to include additional solvable and unsolvable items. The majority of the
additional items were taken from pretesting conducted by Aspinwall and Richter (1999). In
addition, participants in the presence of alternatives condition were presented with 2 sets of 7
solvable anagrams. The majority of the anagrams used in the present study were identical to
those used by Aspinwall and Richter (1999), with exception to an unsolvable anagram that was
later found to be solvable (ocesh; chose). I replaced it with another unsolvable anagram from
their pretested list (afnac). Example solvable items include rolgy (glory), knela (ankle), and
wreat (water). Example unsolvable items include pecit, lelmo, and haacl. In addition, a solvable
item (genud; nudge) as well as an unsolvable item (danze) were created for inclusion in the
present study. The full list of items can be found in Appendix I.
Measures
State orientation (Appendix C). State orientation was measured using two subscales
from the action-control scale (Kuhl, 1994b): pre-occupation and demand-related action
orientation. The original names of the subscales “decision-related” (demand-related) and
“failure-related” (threat-related) were replaced by recommendation of Koole and Jostmann
(2004). Both subscales measured different aspects of action control and, though interrelated,
individuals may score high in one area and low in another (Jostmann & Koole, 2009). The author
also recommends that both of these subscales be administered together (Kuhl, 1994b). Further,
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including the demand-related subscale would be useful for exploratory analysis. Though the
impossible anagram task is technically exposing participants to repeated failure (threat-related;
Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 1981), it has also been conceptualized as a demanding task in
self-control experiments (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998). In addition, previous
depletion studies suggest that SOD is more relevant to persistence-related outcomes in some
circumstances than SOT (Gröpel et al., 2014). Thus, there is a possibility that failure-related state
orientation is more relevant among participants persisting in the presence of alternatives, while
demand-related action orientation is more relevant for assessing persistence in the absence of
alternatives. Thus, the subscales were presented together as one scale with items appearing in
random order.
The 12-item preoccupation subscale (threat-related state orientation) assesses how one
reacts under threatening conditions (α = .66). Each item describes a threatening condition and
asks participants to choose between two answers (action/state-oriented) that best describes how
they would respond. An example item includes, “When I have lost something valuable and can´t
find it anywhere.” The state-oriented response is: “I have a hard time concentrating on anything
else.” The action-oriented response is: “I don’t dwell on it.” Each action-oriented response was
coded as a 0 and each state-oriented response was coded as a 1. The threat-related state
orientation score was obtained by summing all of the items. Higher scores are indicative of
higher state orientation.
The demand-related action orientation subscale assesses how one reacts under
demanding conditions (α = .72). It was included to determine whether it would produce a similar
pattern of results to threat-related action orientation subscale in the present study. Further, as
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action/state–orientation has been one of few individual difference variables to successfully
predict depletion outcomes (Gröpel et al., 2014), it may be important to consider whether
persistence outcomes would differ based on whether a task is perceived as threatening or
demanding. Each item describes stressful conditions and asks participants to choose one of two
answers (action/state) that best describes how they would respond. An example item is: “When I
know I must finish something soon.” The state-oriented response in this example is: “I have to
push myself to get started.” The action-oriented response in this example is: “I find it easy to get
it done and over with.” Each action-oriented response was coded as 0 and each state-oriented
response was coded as a 1. The demand-related score was obtained by summing all of the items.
Higher scores are indicative of higher state orientation.
Optimism (Appendix D). The 6-item revised life orientation test (LOT-R; Scheier,
Carver, & Bridges, 1994; α = .80) was used to assess optimism. This scale was included in order
to test findings regarding optimism and persistence found by Aspinwall and Richter (1999). A
previous attempt failed to find evidence that optimism influenced nonproductive persistence
(Lench & Levine, 2008). Participants were instructed to answer to what extent they agree with
each statement. An example item includes, “In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.”
Responses range from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Four filler items were included
that were not scored, making for a total of 10 items altogether. Additionally, items 3, 7, and 9
were reverse coded. An example of a reverse coded item includes, “If something can go wrong
for me, it will.” An optimism score was created by summing the 6 relevant items. Higher scores
are indicative of greater optimism.
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Self-Control (Appendix E). The 13-item brief self-control scale was included to assess
trait self-control (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004; α = .81). Exploratory analysis was
conducted using this measure to assess if trait self-control predicts persistence outcomes.
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which each statement reflects how they typically are.
Responses ranged from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much). An example item includes, “People
would say that I have iron self-discipline.” Items 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12, and 13 were reverse scored.
An example of a reverse-scored item is, “I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun”.
A score was computed for this measure by summing all of the items. Higher scores were
indicative of greater trait self-control.
Manipulation Checks (Appendix F). PSI-theory suggests that during threat, negative
affect triggers mental systems relevant to single-minded goal pursuit (Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl &
Koole, 2004, 2008). Research suggests that obstacles to goal attainment induce anger, leading to
increased persistence (Levine, 1996). Over time, frustrated goal pursuit leads to other feelings
(such as sadness) that prompt individuals to disengage (Carver, 2004; Carver & Scheier, 1998).
While negative affect relates to avoidance behaviors (behavioral inhibition system), previous
studies suggest that anger is related to approach behaviors (behavioral activation system; Carver
& Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2003). In support of these findings, Lench and Levine
found that, out of all of the negative emotions assessed (anger, sadness, anxiety), only anger
predicted persistence on an unsolvable anagram task (2008). Another study using a similar
experimental design did not find differences in persistence based on negative affect scores
(Randenborgh et al., 2010). However, these findings could be due to issues in measuring discrete
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emotions, such as not using bipolar rating scales consistent with the distress-relaxation
dimension that is most appropriate for measuring frustration on tasks (Russell, 1989).
The present study posits that state orientation predicts persistence outcomes due to issues
related to affect regulation. After the first task as a manipulation check, I assessed six emotions
related to heightened negative activation on the task (from Maslach, 1979a, 1979b): tension,
irritation, apprehension, anxiousness, annoyance, and anger. Each item was rated on a 7-point
semantic differential scale ranging from -3 to +3 with 0 as a midpoint. The Tense-Relaxed item
was reversed coded to match other items. Items were averaged for a combined score to assess
whether persistence on the first task was predicted by scores on each item (α = .78). Given the
previous research only finding results for anger (Lench & Levine, 2008), I also examined each
item separately using bivariate correlations for exploratory analyses.
Emotional reactions are associated with, but not synonymous with, threat. Therefore, I
also included a direct threat perception measure. Feelings of competence are a basic need related
to task motivation (Bandura, 1977; Ryan & Deci, 2000), and thus experiencing failure on a task
is likely to heighten perceptions of threat through competency perceptions (Brunstein & Olbrich,
1985; Covington, 1984; Seifert & O’Keefe, 2001; Thompson, 1993). Participants were asked the
extent to which they felt competent during the first task using an adapted semantic differential
item from Kervyn, Fiske, & Yzerby ( 2013). The original measure used a 1 (incompetent) to 7
(competent) 7-point rating scale, which was adjusted to a -3 (incompetent) to +3 (competent) 7point rating scale more consistent with bipolar ratings. The higher ratings of negative affect as
well as lower ratings of competence were suggestive of greater experiences of threat.
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Finally, I also included a manipulation check item to assess the degree to which
participants believed the second and third tasks would differ from the first task. This was
included in order to assess whether perceptions of subsequent tasks were associated with
persistence on the first task. This item was rated on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (not at all
different) to 3 (very different).

CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Results were analyzed in SPSS Version 24 and R (R Core Team, 2016). Tables were
formatted using the R package APA-Tables (Stanley, 2015). To address missing data, I
implemented a multiple imputation procedure using the R package Amelia II (Honaker, King,
Blackwell, & others, 2011). I used five imputations, based on recommendations that five or
more imputations produce estimates that are less biased than single imputation methods or
listwise deletion (Schafer & Graham, 2002). I analyzed the imputed datasets using the R
package Zelig (Choirat, Honaker, Imai, King, & Lau, 2016; Imai, King, & Lau, 2008). I also
used a single imputation method (median imputation). Results were similar across both
methods, so results for the median-imputed dataset are reported for simplicity.
Preliminary Analysis
I assessed the dependent variable (time spent on task 1). I found evidence of skew (.02)
and kurtosis (.36). In addition, results from a Shapiro-Wilke’s test suggested a violation of
normality (p < .001). I winsorized the top 5% and bottom 5% of the datapoints for this variable.
Results were similar across both the original variable and the winsorized variable, so results for
the original variable are reported. I also conducted analyses for each of the five main models of
interest. According to Hayes (2013), assumptions regarding normality in regression models are
specific to residual errors. There was evidence of slight violations of normality based on QQ-
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plots1. I also assessed for violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity of residuals. Results
from the non-constance variance score test (Cook & Weisberg, 1983; Fox & Weisberg, 2011),
as well as the studentized Breusch-Pagan (Breusch & Pagan, 1979; Zeileis & Hothorn, 2002) do
not suggest this assumption was violated.
Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were included in the study to assess whether the task was threat
inducing. Participants were asked to rate their feelings during the first task on multiple bipolar
scales: relaxed-tense, confident-apprehensive, calm-anxious, not irritated-irritated, sereneannoyed, and peaceful-angry. They were also asked to rate their feelings of incompetencecompetence. The task was deemed threatening if it evoked negative affect and lowered
perceptions of competence. The action control literature suggests that greater threat should be
evoked when a task is less attainable (Jostmann & Koole, 2009). Thus, I ran bivariate
correlations between goal attainability and each of the six negative affect items, the scored
negative affect variable, and perceived competence. The results indicated that goal attainability
was negatively related to annoyed ratings (r = -.16, p = .032). Goal attainability was also
positively related to competence ratings (r = .18, p = .013). However, goal attainability was not
significantly associated with angry ratings (r = -.06, p = .411). These findings are interesting
given that the extant literature on the relationship between approach behaviors (persistence) and
negative affect is specific to anger (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2003).

1

Though Hayes notes that only severe violations of normality substantially influence the validity
of inferences for regression models, he suggests that nonnormality may reduce power (2013).
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Theories of action control suggest that state-orientation is associated with maladaptive
persistence due to an inability to down-regulate negative affect (Jostmann & Koole, 2009;
Koole & Jostmann, 2004). Thus, I also ran bivariate correlations to assess the relationship
between state-orientation and each of the six threat items, the scored negative affect variable,
and perceived competence. None of the tested associations reached significance. I also ran
bivariate correlations to assess whether time spent on the first task was associated with any of
the manipulation check variables. I observed no significant relationships. Intercorrelations,
means, and standard deviations of manipulation check variables are included in Table 2.
I informed participants in the need for resource allocation condition that each task
measured different aspects of verbal ability. I utilized a single item to assess the degree to
which participants believed subsequent tasks would be different from the one they were
working on. I ran a bivariate correlation to assess whether time spent on the first task was
associated with the extent to which participants believed subsequent tasks would be different. In
accordance with the results of Aspinwall and Richter (1999), no significant relationship was
observed (r = .04, p = .706).
I also tested the goal attainability manipulation. Though goal attainability was positively
related to time spent on the first task (r = .15, p = .045), there may be problems regarding the
strength of the manipulation. I manipulated goal attainability by presenting participants with a
task that contained either 0/10 solvable anagrams or 3/10 solvable anagrams. Successfully
influencing perceptions of attainability depended on participants in the attainable condition
completing the solvable problems. The frequency of problems solved on the first task among
those in the attainable condition is presented in Table 1:
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Table 1
Frequency of Problems Solved in the Attainable Condition
Problems Solved
on Task 1
0
1
2
3

Frequency
19
38
27
8

The majority of participants (91.3%) did not complete all three problems, and 20.7% of
participants did not complete any problems. I conducted a Welch’s t-test to compare the number
of problems solved in the resource allocation condition (M = 1.22) and the no resource
allocation condition (M = 1.30). Results did not suggest there was a difference in problems
solved across resource allocation conditions, t(89.71) = 0.47, p = .641. I also conducted
equivalence testing (Lakens, 2017). The TOST procedure based on Welch's t-test indicated that
the observed effect size (d = 0.1) was significantly within the equivalent bounds of d = -0.6 and
d = 0.6, (or in raw scores: -0.53 and 0.53), t(89.71) = -2.41, p = .009. While the results suggest
that the amount of problems solved may not have differed across resource allocation conditions,
it is possible that a difference may be observed with larger samples (Morey & Lakens, under
review). One may argue that variations in the number of problems solved were due to individual
differences in motivation and ability. Altogether, the results do not suggest that the current
design uniformly manipulated perceptions of attainability, as approximately one-fifth of
participants in the attainable condition were unable to solve even one problem to provide the
impression of attainability and the vast majority were unable to complete all three problems to
establish strong impressions of attainability.
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The action control literature suggests that experiencing greater failure on one task would
negatively influence performance on a subsequent task (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl, 1981). I
observed evidence that the number of problems solved in task 2 was positively related to the
amount of problems solved in task 3 (r = .48, p < .001). However, the number of problems
solved for the first task was significantly related to neither the number of problems solved in task
2 (r = -.04, p = .783), nor to the number of problems solved in task 3 (r = -.05, p = .737). This
may suggest that the manipulation was not strong enough to produce results in line with previous
action control research.
Further, I tested whether the number of problems solved on task one was associated with
perceptions of competence and negative affect ratings. I also assessed whether the number of
problems solved on the first task influenced performance on subsequent tasks. The bivariate
correlation analyses did not yield significant results. Interestingly, affective ratings specific to
task 1 were only related to performance on task 3. The number of problems solved on task 3 was
associated with apprehension (r = -.23, p = .025), annoyance (r = -.22, p = .037), and overall
negative affect (r = -.22, p = .032). This may indicate that the negative affect experienced from
task 1 carried over to the third task. An alternative explanation is that negative affect ratings
influenced how participants allocated their time and effort between tasks.

Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and correlations
Var
1. RA
2. TT1

M

SD

0.51

0.50

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

496.50

314.60

3. C1

1.26

0.89

-.05

.51**

4. C2

4.39

2.05

-

-.32**

-.04

5. C3

2.80

2.37

-

-.34**

-.05

6. SOT

6.74

2.55

.00

.00

.00

.02

-.09

7. SOD

5.54

2.90

.05

.01

-.12

-.06

-.15

.31**

8. Op

14.45

4.99

-.02

.02

.03

.03

.11

-.33**

-.29**

9. SC

41.48

8.62

.02

.03

.13

-.00

.02

-.15*

-.52**

.29**

10. Res

12.07

3.24

.07

-.00

.15

.02

.07

-.17*

-.44**

.18*

.79**

11. Imp

12.88

3.59

-.01

.08

.09

.05

-.01

-.09

-.38**

.19**

.82**

12. Ten

1.58

1.40

-.08

.01

.04

.10

-.08

.10

-.03

-.10

.08

.05

13. App

0.96

1.87

.03

.04

-.00

.07

-.25*

-.01

.03

.07

.02

-.07

.10

.18*

14. Anx

0.99

1.63

-.02

.05

.10

.11

-.01

.13

.01

-.08

-.05

-.09

-.03

.47**

.30**

15. Irr

1.36

1.69

-.03

.03

-.04

.10

-.17

.05

.13

-.07

-.03

-.09

.03

.40**

.32**

.33**

16. Ann

1.32

1.53

.07

.05

.11

.10

-.19

.01

.08

-.08

.01

.02

.02

.37**

.33**

.43**

.60**

17. Ang

0.30

1.55

-.03

-.02

.07

.09

-.16

.13

.13

-.16*

-.07

-.04

-.03

.38**

.23**

.43**

.43**

.60**

18. Com

-1.39

1.44

-.09

.01

-.17

.04

.15

-.05

-.11

.07

.03

.06

-.05

-.20**

-.20**

-.23**

-.30**

-.33**

-.21**

19. Aff

1.08

1.12

-.01

.04

.06

.14

-.20*

.10

.08

-.09

-.01

-.06

.04

.64**

.59**

.70**

.74**

.79**

.72**

-.35**

20. Dif

0.85

1.60

-

.04

.06

.15

.12

-.05

-.15

-.02

-.06

-.03

.10

.10

.14

.28**

-.01

19

-.19*

.51**

.27**

.46**
.07

-.14

-.08

.08

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively; RA = Resource allocation; GA = Goal attainability; C1 = Problems correctly solved on task 1; C2 =
Problems correctly solved on task 2; C3 = Problems correctly solved on task 3; SOT = Threat related state-orientation; SOD = Demand-related state-orientation; Op = Optimism; SC = Self-Control; Res = Restraint; Imp =
Impulsivity; Ten = Tense; App = Apprehensive; Anx = Anxious; Irr = Irritable; Ann = Annoyed; Com = Competent; Aff = Scored Affect; Dif =Perception that subsequent tasks would be different.
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Hypothesis Tests
Results for hypotheses 1-3 were analyzed using moderated multiple regression. The
dependent variable was persistence on task 1 (in minutes). In Step 1, the continuous state
orientation predictor was added to the model (threat-related subscale). In Step 2, the
dichotomous resource allocation condition was added to the model. Comparisons between the
resource allocation conditions were achieved through dummy coding: no resource allocation (0)
and resource allocation (1).
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive significant relationship between state
orientation and persistence. I did not find evidence that state-orientation predicted time spent on
the first task, R2 = .000, β = .00, F(1,181) = .00, p = .995. Thus, support was not found for
hypothesis 1.2
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the need for resource allocation would be
negatively related to persistence. Results indicated that need for resource allocation
significantly predicted time spent on the first task in the expected direction, R2 = .036, β = -.19,
F(1,181) = 6.69, p = .010. Thus, support was found for hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 examined whether there was an interaction between threat
related state-orientation (SOT) and need for resource allocation in predicting time spent on the
first task. Results indicated that the SOT by need for resource allocation interaction did not

2

Additional analyses were conducted for hypotheses 1, 3, 4a, and 4b controlling for demandrelated state-orientation. Results were similar when controlling for demand-related stateorientation, so the original results for each model are presented.
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explain additional variance in time spent on the first task, F(1,179) = .01, p = .928, ΔR2 = .000.
Thus, hypothesis 3 was not supported. Results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3
Hypothesis 3: Regression results using TimeTask1 as the criterion

Predictor
(Intercept)
SOT

b
496.13**
0.05

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[365.82, 626.45]
[-18.04, 18.15]

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.00

[-0.15, 0.15]

sr

2

.00

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[.00, 1.00]

r

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

.00
R2 = .000
[.00, 1.00]

(Intercept)
SOT
RA

(Intercept)
SOT
RA
I(SOT * RA)

556.58**
0.12
-118.54*

550.98**
0.95
-107.48
-1.64

[420.18, 692.98]
[-17.70, 17.94]
[-209.20, -27.88]

[367.73, 734.22]
[-24.49, 26.40]
[-364.88, 149.92]
[-37.38, 34.10]

0.00
-0.19

0.01
-0.17
-0.02

[-0.14, 0.15]
[-0.33, -0.04]

[-0.20, 0.21]
[-0.58, 0.24]
[-0.46, 0.42]

.00
.04

.00
.00
.00

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .09]

[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .02]
[-.00, .00]

.00
-.19*
R2 = .036*
[.00, .10]

ΔR2 = .036*
[-.02, .09]

R2 = .036
[.00, .09]

ΔR2 = .000
[-.00, .00]

.00
-.19*

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; SOT = Threat related state-orientation; RA = Resource allocation; I = Interaction
.
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Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Hypotheses 4a and 4b assessed competing interaction
hypotheses. Hypothesis 4a examined the interaction between threat-related state-orientation
(SOT) and goal attainability in predicting time spent on the first task. Comparisons between
attainability conditions were achieved through dummy coding: unattainable (0), attainable (1).
Results from a moderated multiple regression indicated that the SOT by goal attainability
interaction did not explain additional variance in time spent on the first task, F(1,179) = .00, p =
.411, ΔR2 = .004). Results are displayed in Table 4.
Hypothesis 4b examined the 3-way interaction between threat-related state-orientation
(SOT), goal attainability, and need for resource allocation in predicting time spent on the first
task. A hierarchical linear regression assessed whether the three-way interaction explained
additional variance in time spent on the first task. No significant results emerged, F(1, 175) =
.47, p = .494, ΔR2 = .002. Results are displayed in Table 5.

Table 4
Hypothesis 4a: Regression results using TimeTask1 as the criterion

(Intercept)
SOT

496.13**
0.05

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[365.82, 626.45]
[-18.04, 18.15]

(Intercept)
SOT
GA

452.02**
-0.35
93.16*

(Intercept)
SOT
GA
I(SOT * GA)

500.96**
-7.67
-8.01
15.01

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr

2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[.00, 1.00]

r

0.00

[-0.15, 0.15]

.00

.00

[315.75, 588.29]
[-18.30, 17.60]
[1.87, 184.45]

-0.00
0.15

[-0.15, 0.14]
[0.00, 0.29]

.00
.02

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .06]

.00
.15*

[321.16, 680.76]
[-32.78, 17.43]
[-266.88, 250.85]
[-20.93, 50.96]

-0.06
-0.01
0.18

[-0.27, 0.14]
[-0.43, 0.40]
[-0.26, 0.62]

.00
.00
.00

[-.01, .01]
[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .02]

.00
.15*

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .000
[.00, 1.00]

R2 = .022
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .022*
[-.02, .06]

R2 = .026
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .004
[-.01, .02]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; SOT = Threat related state-orientation; GA = Goal attainability; I = Interaction.
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Table 5
Hypothesis 4b: Regression results using TimeTask1 as the criterion

-0.00
-0.18
0.14

[-0.15, 0.14]
[-0.33, -0.04]
[-0.00, 0.29]

.00
.03
.02

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .09]
[-.02, .06]

.00
-.19*
.15*

512.72**
-0.27
-116.06*
89.96

(Intercept)
SOT
RA
GA
I(SOT * GA)
I(SOT * RA)
I(GA * RA)

593.36**
-8.55
-143.48
-81.09
18.72
-3.17
88.75

[354.69, 832.02]
[-40.38, 23.27]
[-416.03, 129.06]
[-355.27, 193.09]
[-17.08, 54.51]
[-38.96, 32.61]
[-92.42, 269.91]

-0.07
-0.23
-0.13
0.23
-0.04
0.12

[-0.33, 0.19]
[-0.66, 0.21]
[-0.57, 0.31]
[-0.21, 0.67]
[-0.48, 0.40]
[-0.13, 0.37]

.00
.01
.00
.01
.00
.00

[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .03]
[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .03]
[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .02]

.00
-.19*
.15*

(Intercept)
SOT
RA
GA
I(SOT * GA)
I(SOT * RA)
I(GA * RA)
I(SOT * RA * GA)

546.75**
-1.80
-61.84
3.36
6.21
-15.33
-79.70
24.89

[272.59, 820.90]
[-39.14, 35.53]
[-422.14, 298.46]
[-363.50, 370.21]
[-44.63, 57.04]
[-65.43, 34.78]
[-597.73, 438.32]
[-46.81, 96.59]

-0.01
-0.10
0.01
0.08
-0.19
-0.11
0.26

[-0.32, 0.29]
[-0.67, 0.48]
[-0.58, 0.59]
[-0.55, 0.70]
[-0.80, 0.42]
[-0.83, 0.61]
[-0.49, 1.01]

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .01]
[-.00, .00]
[-.00, .01]
[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .02]

.00
-.19*
.15*

b

beta

r

(Intercept)
SOT
RA
GA

Predictor

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[370.46, 654.97]
[-17.95, 17.41]
[-206.04, -26.08]
[-0.00, 179.93]

sr

2

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .056*
[.00, .12]

R2 = .067
[.00, .12]

ΔR2 = .011
[-.02, .04]

R2 = .070
[.00, .12]

ΔR2 = .002
[-.01, .02]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents
unstandardized regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order
correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; SOT = Threat related state-orientation; GA = Goal attainability; RA =
Resource allocation; I = Interaction.
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Exploratory Analyses
Exploratory Analysis: SOD, Optimism, and Self-Control. Exploratory analyses were
conducted to test Hypotheses 1, 3, 4a, and 4b using the following as independent variables:
demand-related state-orientation (SOD), optimism, and self-control. Based on recommendations
from Maloney, Grawitch, and Barber (2012), I looked at restraint and impulsivity as distinct
factors of the brief self-control scale. According to them, the restraint factor more closely
represents self-control. The analyses I conducted with impulsivity and restraint were not
preregistered.
For hypothesis 1, I tested whether each of the exploratory variables predicted time spent
on the first task. No significant relationships were observed between time spent on the first task
and each of the exploratory variables: demand-related state-orientation (R2 = .000, β = .01, F[1,
181] = .01, p = .933), optimism (R2 = .000, β = .02, F[1, 181] = .05, p = .826), self-control (R2 =
.001, β = .03, F[1, 181] = .20, p = .654), restraint (R2 = .000, β = -.00, F[1, 181] = .00, p = .989),
and impulsivity (R2 = .007, β = .09, F[1, 181] = .01, p = .254).

For hypothesis 3, I tested interactions between each of the exploratory variables and need
for resource allocation in predicting time spent on the first task. This was achieved using
moderated multiple regression. No significant interaction effects emerged. Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10 contain the results.

Table 6
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 3: Regression results using SOD as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion

Predictor
(Intercept)
SOD

b
492.73**
0.68

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[393.20, 592.25]
[-15.25, 16.61]

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.01

[-0.14, 0.15]

sr

2

.00

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[.00, .01]

r

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

.01
R2 = .000
[.00, .01]

(Intercept)
SOD
RA

(Intercept)
SOD
RA
I(SOD * RA)

547.79**
1.78
-119.09*

601.19**
-8.14
-231.01*
20.20

[441.18, 654.40]
[-13.92, 17.49]
[-209.87, -28.31]

[466.29, 736.10]
[-30.12, 13.84]
[-426.96, -35.06]
[-11.16, 51.57]

0.02
-0.19

-0.07
-0.37
0.22

[-0.13, 0.16]
[-0.33, -0.05]

[-0.28, 0.13]
[-0.68, -0.06]
[-0.12, 0.57]

.00
.04

.00
.03
.01

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .09]

[-.01, .02]
[-.02, .08]
[-.02, .03]

.01
-.19*
R2 = .036*
[.00, .10]

ΔR2 = .036*
[-.02, .09]

R2 = .045*
[.00, .10]

ΔR2 = .009
[-.02, .03]

.01
-.19*

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents
unstandardized regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order
correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; SOD = Demand related state-orientation; RA = Resource allocation; I =
Interaction.
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Table 7
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 3: Regression results using Optimism as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)
Optimism

481.65**
1.03

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[340.45, 622.85]
[-8.21, 10.27]

(Intercept)
Optimism
RA

546.27**
0.76
-118.37*

[398.66, 693.88]
[-8.34, 9.87]
[-209.05, -27.69]

0.01
-0.19

[-0.13, 0.16]
[-0.33, -0.04]

.00
.04

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .09]

.02
-.19*

(Intercept)
Optimism
RA
I(Optimism * RA)

657.52**
-6.88
-321.29*
14.03

[451.42, 863.62]
[-20.31, 6.56]
[-599.70, -42.88]
[-4.18, 32.24]

-0.11
-0.51
0.36

[-0.32, 0.10]
[-0.96, -0.07]
[-0.11, 0.83]

.01
.03
.01

[-.02, .03]
[-.02, .07]
[-.02, .04]

.02
-.19*

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.02

[-0.13, 0.16]

.00

[.00, .02]

.02

sr

2

r

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .000
[.00, .02]

R2 = .036*
[.00, .10]

ΔR2 = .036*
[-.02, .09]

R2 = .048*
[.00, .11]

ΔR2 = .012
[-.02, .04]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; RA = Resource allocation; I = Interaction.
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Table 8
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 3: Regression results using Self-Control as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)
Self-Control

445.97**
1.22

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[219.34, 672.60]
[-4.13, 6.57]

(Intercept)
Self-Control
RA

502.56**
1.33
-118.90*

[275.28, 729.83]
[-3.94, 6.60]
[-209.51, -28.29]

0.04
-0.19

[-0.11, 0.18]
[-0.33, -0.05]

.00
.04

[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .09]

.03
-.19*

428.97*
3.11
19.19
-3.33

[102.63, 755.31]
[-4.63, 10.84]
[-428.84, 467.23]
[-13.91, 7.25]

0.09
0.03
-0.23

[-0.13, 0.30]
[-0.68, 0.74]
[-0.96, 0.50]

.00
.00
.00

[-.01, .02]
[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .01]

.03
-.19*

Predictor

(Intercept)
Self-Control
RA
I(Self-Control * RA)

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.03

[-0.11, 0.18]

.00

[.00, .03]

.03

sr

2

r

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .001
[.00, .03]

R2 = .037*
[.00, .10]

ΔR2 = .036*
[-.02, .09]

R2 = .039
[.00, .09]

ΔR2 = .002
[-.01, .01]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; RA = Resource allocation; I = Interaction.
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Table 9
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 3: Regression results using Restraint as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion

(Intercept)
Restraint

497.70**
-0.10

(Intercept)
Restraint
RA

544.34**
1.10
-119.01*

[365.76, 722.92]
[-12.93, 15.13]
[-209.85, -28.16]

0.01
-0.19

[-0.13, 0.16]
[-0.33, -0.04]

.00
.04

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .09]

-.00
-.19*

(Intercept)
Restraint
RA
I(Restraint * RA)

541.43**
1.35
-113.48
-0.46

[287.99, 794.86]
[-19.31, 22.01]
[-465.51, 238.54]
[-28.68, 27.76]

0.01
-0.18
-0.01

[-0.20, 0.23]
[-0.74, 0.38]
[-0.60, 0.58]

.00
.00
.00

[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .02]
[-.00, .00]

-.00
-.19*

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

-0.00

[-0.15, 0.15]

.00

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[319.98, 675.41]
[-14.32, 14.12]

sr

2

[.00, 1.00]

r
-.00

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .000
[.00, 1.00]

R2 = .036*
[.00, .10]

ΔR2 = .04*
[-.02, .09]

R2 = .036
[.00, .09]

ΔR2 = .00
[-.00, .00]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; RA = Resource allocation; I = Interaction.
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Table 10
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 3: Regression results using Impulsivity as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)
Impuls

400.68**
7.44

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[229.34, 572.02]
[-5.38, 20.26]

(Intercept)
Impuls
RA

464.23**
7.20
-117.80*

[288.58, 639.88]
[-5.42, 19.83]
[-208.15, -27.45]

0.08
-0.19

[-0.06, 0.23]
[-0.33, -0.04]

.01
.04

[-.02, .03]
[-.02, .09]

.08
-.19*

(Intercept)
Impuls
RA
I(Impuls * RA)

380.22**
13.70
30.97
-11.54

[124.80, 635.64]
[-5.40, 32.80]
[-309.46, 371.40]
[-37.01, 13.92]

0.16
0.05
-0.26

[-0.06, 0.37]
[-0.49, 0.59]
[-0.82, 0.31]

.01
.00
.00

[-.02, .04]
[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .02]

.08
-.19*

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.08

[-0.06, 0.23]

.01

[.00, .05]

.08

sr

2

r

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .007
[.00, .05]

R2 = .042*
[.00, .11]

ΔR2 = .04*
[-.02, .09]

R2 = .047*
[.00, .11]

ΔR2 = .00
[-.01, .02]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; RA = Resource allocation; I = Interaction.
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For hypothesis 4a, I tested interactions between each of the exploratory variables and
goal attainability in predicting time spent on the first task. This was achieved using moderated
multiple regression. No significant interaction effects emerged. Tables 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15
contain the results.
For hypothesis 4b, I tested three-way interactions between each of the exploratory
variables, goal attainability, and need for resource allocation in predicting time spent on the first
task. This was achieved using hierarchical linear regression. Tables 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20
contain the results. A significant interaction emerged for the restraint predictor, F(1,175) = 2.53,
p = .029, ΔR2 = .025. A simple slopes analysis was conducted (Figure 4). Interesting trends
emerged among those in the no need for resource allocation condition. Specifically, when a goal
was attainable, higher restraint was associated with greater persistence. When a goal was
unattainable, higher restraint was associated with less persistence.33

3

Confidence intervals for ΔR2 were calculated following the procedures of Alf and Graf (1999).
The confidence intervals suggest the interaction was not significant. However, the method
provided by Alf and Graf may provide inaccurate estimates in smaller samples (Algina &
Moulder, 2001).
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Figure 4. Interaction of restraint, goal attainability, and resource allocation in predicting
persistence (time spent on the first task).

Table 11
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4a: Regression results using SOD as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)
SOD

492.73**
0.68

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[393.20, 592.25]
[-15.25, 16.61]

(Intercept)
SOD
GA

436.05**
2.34
94.49*

[323.07, 549.03]
[-13.54, 18.21]
[2.77, 186.21]

0.02
0.15

[-0.12, 0.17]
[0.00, 0.30]

.00
.02

[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .06]

.01
.15*

(Intercept)
SOD
GA
I(SOD * GA)

432.01**
3.03
101.91
-1.34

[283.31, 580.71]
[-19.90, 25.96]
[-97.48, 301.29]
[-33.19, 30.52]

0.03
0.16
-0.01

[-0.18, 0.24]
[-0.16, 0.48]
[-0.35, 0.33]

.00
.01
.00

[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .03]
[-.00, .00]

.01
.15*

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.01

[-0.14, 0.15]

.00

[.00, .01]

.01

sr

2

r

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .000
[.00, .01]

R2 = .022
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .022*
[-.02, .06]

R2 = .023
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .000
[-.00, .00]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; SOD = Demand related state-orientation; GA = Goal Attainability; I = Interaction.
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Table 12
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4a: Regression results using Optimism as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)
Optimism

481.65**
1.03

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[340.45, 622.85]
[-8.21, 10.27]

(Intercept)
Optimism
GA

447.28**
0.17
92.96*

[303.19, 591.37]
[-9.03, 9.38]
[1.31, 184.62]

0.00
0.15

[-0.14, 0.15]
[0.00, 0.29]

.00
.02

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .06]

.02
.15*

(Intercept)
Optimism
GA
I(Optimism * GA)

431.46**
1.30
128.32
-2.44

[243.70, 619.21]
[-11.29, 13.90]
[-154.94, 411.58]
[-20.95, 16.06]

0.02
0.20
-0.06

[-0.18, 0.22]
[-0.25, 0.66]
[-0.55, 0.42]

.00
.00
.00

[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .02]
[-.01, .01]

.02
.15*

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.02

[-0.13, 0.16]

.00

[.00, .02]

.02

sr

2

r

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .000
[.00, .02]

R2 = .022
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .022*
[-.02, .06]

R2 = .022
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .000
[-.01, .01]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; GA = Goal Attainability; I = Interaction.
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Table 13
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4a: Regression results using Self-Control as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)
Self-Control

445.97**
1.22

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[219.34, 672.60]
[-4.13, 6.57]

(Intercept)
Self-Control
GA

442.68**
0.18
92.54

[217.78, 667.58]
[-5.24, 5.59]
[-0.49, 185.56]

0.00
0.15

[-0.14, 0.15]
[-0.00, 0.30]

.00
.02

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .06]

.03
.15*

(Intercept)
Self-Control
GA
I(Self-Control * GA)

516.47**
-1.68
-44.34
3.32

[185.13, 847.81]
[-9.84, 6.49]
[-504.50, 415.82]
[-7.60, 14.24]

-0.05
-0.07
0.24

[-0.27, 0.18]
[-0.80, 0.66]
[-0.54, 1.02]

.00
.00
.00

[-.01, .01]
[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .01]

.03
.15*

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.03

[-0.11, 0.18]

.00

[.00, .03]

.03

sr

2

r

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .001
[.00, .03]

R2 = .022
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .021
[-.02, .06]

R2 = .024
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .002
[-.01, .01]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; GA = Goal Attainability; I = Interaction.
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Table 14
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4a: Regression results using Restraint as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

[-0.15, 0.15]

.00

[.00, 1.00]

(Intercept)
Restraint

497.70**
-0.10

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[319.98, 675.41]
[-14.32, 14.12]

(Intercept)
Restraint
GA

487.04**
-3.28
97.60*

[310.60, 663.48]
[-17.70, 11.14]
[4.28, 190.92]

-0.03
0.16

[-0.18, 0.11]
[0.01, 0.30]

.00
.02

[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .07]

-.00
.15*

(Intercept)
Restraint
GA
I(Restraint * GA)

552.75**
-9.05
-45.69
11.86

[314.41, 791.09]
[-29.20, 11.10]
[-406.96, 315.59]
[-17.02, 40.73]

-0.09
-0.07
0.25

[-0.30, 0.11]
[-0.65, 0.50]
[-0.37, 0.88]

.00
.00
.00

[-.01, .02]
[-.00, .01]
[-.01, .02]

-.00
.15*

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

-0.00

r
-.00

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .000
[.00, 1.00]

R2 = .023
[.00, .08]

ΔR2 = .02*
[-.02, .07]

R2 = .027
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .00
[-.01, .02]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; GA = Goal Attainability; I = Interaction.
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Table 15
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4a: Regression results using Impulsivity as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)
Impuls

400.68**
7.44

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[229.34, 572.02]
[-5.38, 20.26]

(Intercept)
Impuls
GA

387.75**
5.09
86.00

[216.92, 558.57]
[-7.90, 18.07]
[-6.91, 178.91]

0.06
0.14

[-0.09, 0.21]
[-0.01, 0.29]

.00
.02

[-.01, .02]
[-.02, .06]

.08
.15*

(Intercept)
Impuls
GA
I(Impuls * GA)

383.65**
5.42
93.80
-0.61

[137.85, 629.45]
[-14.05, 24.90]
[-254.26, 441.85]
[-26.80, 25.59]

0.06
0.15
-0.01

[-0.16, 0.28]
[-0.41, 0.70]
[-0.62, 0.59]

.00
.00
.00

[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .01]
[-.00, .00]

.08
.15*

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.08

[-0.06, 0.23]

.01

[.00, .05]

.08

sr2

r

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .007
[.00, .05]

R2 = .025
[.00, .08]

ΔR2 = .02
[-.02, .06]

R2 = .025
[.00, .07]

ΔR2 = .00
[-.00, .00]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; GA = Goal Attainability; I = Interaction.
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Table 16
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4b: Regression results using SOD as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion

0.03
-0.19
0.15

[-0.11, 0.18]
[-0.33, -0.04]
[0.00, 0.29]

.00
.03
.02

[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .09]
[-.02, .06]

.01
-.19*
.15*

491.73**
3.38
-117.06*
91.88*

(Intercept)
SOD
RA
GA
I(SOD * GA)
I(SOD * RA)
I(GA * RA)

581.27**
-8.12
-283.66*
30.72
1.52
21.10
98.54

[392.39, 770.16]
[-36.53, 20.30]
[-507.52, -59.80]
[-184.96, 246.39]
[-30.03, 33.06]
[-10.43, 52.63]
[-82.71, 279.78]

-0.07
-0.45
0.05
0.02
0.23
0.14

[-0.34, 0.19]
[-0.81, -0.10]
[-0.29, 0.39]
[-0.32, 0.35]
[-0.12, 0.59]
[-0.11, 0.39]

.00
.03
.00
.00
.01
.01

[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .08]
[-.01, .01]
[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .04]
[-.02, .03]

.01
-.19*
.15*

(Intercept)
SOD
RA
GA
I(SOD * GA)
I(SOD * RA)
I(GA * RA)
I(SOD * RA * GA)

568.34**
-5.88
-259.91
52.16
-2.42
17.03
54.57
7.90

[352.49, 784.19]
[-39.51, 27.75]
[-554.07, 34.26]
[-223.93, 328.26]
[-47.06, 42.22]
[-28.40, 62.45]
[-341.48, 450.63]
[-55.37, 71.17]

-0.05
-0.41
0.08
-0.03
0.19
0.08
0.07

[-0.36, 0.26]
[-0.88, 0.05]
[-0.36, 0.52]
[-0.50, 0.45]
[-0.32, 0.69]
[-0.47, 0.62]
[-0.49, 0.62]

.00
.02
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .05]
[-.01, .01]
[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .02]
[-.01, .01]
[-.00, .01]

.01
-.19*
.15*

b

beta

r

(Intercept)
SOD
RA
GA

Predictor

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[372.50, 610.97]
[-12.28, 19.03]
[-207.11, -27.01]
[1.53, 182.24]

sr

2

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .057*
[.00, .12]

R2 = .071*
[.00, .12]

ΔR2 = .014
[-.02, .05]

R2 = .071
[.00, .12]

ΔR2 = .000
[-.00, .01]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; SOD = Demand related state-orientation; GA = Goal attainability; RA = Resource allocation; I =
Interaction.
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Table 17
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4b: Regression results using Optimism as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

[-0.14, 0.14]
[-0.33, -0.04]
[-0.00, 0.29]

.00
.03
.02

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .09]
[-.02, .06]

.02
-.19*
.15*

(Intercept)
Optimism
RA
GA

511.75**
-0.06
-116.08*
89.99

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[361.25, 662.24]
[-9.13, 9.01]
[-206.08, -26.08]
[-0.34, 180.31]

(Intercept)
Optimism
RA
GA
I(Optimism * GA)
I(Optimism * RA)
I(GA * RA)

616.62**
-5.83
-353.16*
106.45
-3.79
13.79
74.83

[381.60, 851.63]
[-21.13, 9.47]
[-639.58, -66.73]
[-190.99, 403.88]
[-22.09, 14.51]
[-4.53, 32.11]
[-105.88, 255.55]

-0.09
-0.56
0.17
-0.10
0.35
0.10

[-0.34, 0.15]
[-1.02, -0.11]
[-0.30, 0.64]
[-0.58, 0.38]
[-0.12, 0.82]
[-0.15, 0.35]

.00
.03
.00
.00
.01
.00

[-.01, .02]
[-.02, .08]
[-.01, .02]
[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .04]
[-.01, .02]

.02
-.19*
.15*

(Intercept)
Optimism
RA
GA
I(Optimism * GA)
I(Optimism * RA)
I(GA * RA)
I(Optimism * RA * GA)

664.05**
-9.19
-448.91*
-16.29
4.60
20.64
294.37
-15.14

[401.99, 926.11]
[-26.55, 8.17]
[-818.41, -79.41]
[-438.09, 405.50]
[-22.83, 32.03]
[-4.14, 45.41]
[-269.79, 858.53]
[-51.99, 21.71]

-0.15
-0.72
-0.03
0.12
0.53
0.41
-0.34

[-0.42, 0.13]
[-1.30, -0.13]
[-0.70, 0.65]
[-0.60, 0.84]
[-0.11, 1.17]
[-0.37, 1.19]
[-1.15, 0.48]

.01
.03
.00
.00
.01
.01
.00

[-.02, .03]
[-.02, .08]
[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .05]
[-.02, .03]
[-.01, .02]

.02
-.19*
.15*

Predictor

b

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

-0.00
-0.18
0.14

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .056*
[.00, .12]

R2 = .073*
[.00, .13]

ΔR2 = .017
[-.02, .05]

R2 = .076*
[.00, .13]

ΔR2 = .003
[-.01, .02]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; GA = Goal attainability; RA = Resource allocation; I = Interaction.
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Table 18
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4b: Regression results using Self-Control as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
Predictor
(Intercept)
Self-Control
RA
GA

(Intercept)
Self-Control
RA
GA
I(Self-Control * GA)
I(Self-Control * RA)
I(GA * RA)

(Intercept)
Self-Control
RA
GA
I(Self-Control * GA)
I(Self-Control * RA)
I(GA * RA)
I(Self-Control * RA * GA)

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

.00
.03
.02

[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .09]
[-.02, .06]

.03
-.19*
.15*

[-0.24, 0.28]
[-0.64, 0.79]
[-0.97, 0.52]
[-0.47, 1.08]
[-1.11, 0.38]
[-0.11, 0.40]

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.01

[-.00, .00]
[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .02]
[-.01, .02]
[-.02, .03]

.03
-.19*
.15*

[-0.37, 0.23]
[-1.41, 0.68]
[-1.70, 0.39]
[-0.34, 1.89]
[-1.00, 1.24]
[-0.40, 2.13]
[-2.14, 0.56]

.00
.00
.01
.01
.00
.01
.01

[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .02]
[-.02, .03]
[-.02, .04]
[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .04]
[-.02, .03]

.03
-.19*
.15*

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

498.10**
0.32
-116.19*
88.85

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[272.43, 723.77]
[-5.01, 5.66]
[-206.18, -26.19]
[-2.83, 180.54]

0.01
-0.19
0.14

[-0.14, 0.15]
[-0.33, -0.04]
[-0.00, 0.29]

508.64*
0.64
48.44
-139.95
4.28
-5.25
103.79

[121.40, 895.87]
[-8.79, 10.07]
[-400.28, 497.16]
[-607.54, 327.64]
[-6.58, 15.14]
[-16.06, 5.55]
[-80.05, 287.63]

0.02
0.08
-0.22
0.31
-0.36
0.14

635.56**
-2.54
-229.86
-409.26
10.80
1.74
625.87
-12.65

[191.58, 1079.54]
[-13.43, 8.35]
[-884.87, 425.15]
[-1066.38, 247.86]
[-4.79, 26.38]
[-14.40, 17.88]
[-288.62, 1540.35]
[-34.37, 9.06]

-0.07
-0.37
-0.65
0.77
0.12
0.87
-0.79

b

sr

2

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .056*
[.00, .12]

R2 = .068
[.00, .12]

ΔR2 = .012
[-.02, .04]

R2 = .075
[.00, .12]

ΔR2 = .007
[-.02, .03]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; GA = Goal attainability; RA = Resource allocation; I = Interaction.
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Table 19
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4b: Regression results using Restraint as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion

-0.02
-0.18
0.15

[-0.17, 0.13]
[-0.33, -0.04]
[0.00, 0.29]

.00
.03
.02

[-.01, .01]
[-.02, .08]
[-.02, .06]

-.00
-.19*
.15*

532.72**
-1.96
-115.17*
92.63*

(Intercept)
Restraint
RA
GA
I(Restraint * GA)
I(Restraint * RA)
I(GA * RA)

599.48**
-5.76
-92.79
-115.29
13.43
-5.85
91.22

[308.18, 890.78]
[-30.13, 18.62]
[-444.16, 258.57]
[-481.24, 250.66]
[-15.29, 42.16]
[-34.60, 22.89]
[-93.95, 276.39]

-0.06
-0.15
-0.18
0.29
-0.12
0.13

[-0.31, 0.19]
[-0.71, 0.41]
[-0.77, 0.40]
[-0.33, 0.91]
[-0.73, 0.48]
[-0.13, 0.38]

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.01

[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .02]
[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .02]

-.00
-.19*
.15*

(Intercept)
Restraint
RA
GA
I(Restraint * GA)
I(Restraint * RA)
I(GA * RA)
I(Restraint * RA * GA)

768.12**
-20.65
-439.00
-514.42*
46.99*
24.56
858.02*
-63.54*

[442.74, 1093.50]
[-48.20, 6.91]
[-904.88, 26.87]
[-1023.28, -5.56]
[5.62, 88.36]
[-14.82, 63.95]
[147.02, 1569.01]
[-120.46, -6.61]

-0.21
-0.70
-0.82
1.01
0.51
1.19
-1.20

[-0.50, 0.07]
[-1.44, 0.04]
[-1.63, -0.01]
[0.12, 1.90]
[-0.31, 1.34]
[0.20, 2.17]
[-2.28, -0.13]

.01
.02
.02
.03
.01
.03
.03

[-.02, .04]
[-.02, .05]
[-.02, .06]
[-.02, .07]
[-.02, .03]
[-.02, .08]
[-.02, .07]

-.00
-.19*
.15*

b

beta

r

(Intercept)
Restraint
RA
GA

Predictor

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[355.20, 710.24]
[-16.21, 12.29]
[-205.37, -24.97]
[0.58, 184.68]

sr

2

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .057*
[.00, .12]

R2 = .067
[.00, .12]

ΔR2 = .01
[-.02, .04]

R2 = .092*
[.00, .15]

ΔR2 = .03*
[-.02, .07]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; GA = Goal attainability; RA = Resource allocation; I = Interaction.

59

Table 20
Exploratory Analysis Hypothesis 4b: Regression results using Impulsivity as the predictor and TimeTask1 as the criterion
sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

.00
.03
.02

[-.01, .02]
[-.02, .08]
[-.02, .05]

.08
-.19*
.15*

[-0.12, 0.41]
[-0.53, 0.55]
[-0.54, 0.61]
[-0.60, 0.60]
[-0.88, 0.27]
[-0.10, 0.40]

.01
.00
.00
.00
.01
.01

[-.02, .03]
[-.00, .00]
[-.00, .00]
[-.00, .00]
[-.02, .03]
[-.02, .03]

.08
-.19*
.15*

[-0.18, 0.45]
[-0.81, 0.74]
[-0.84, 0.83]
[-0.85, 0.96]
[-1.11, 0.60]
[-0.74, 1.18]
[-1.11, 0.95]

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

[-.01, .02]
[-.00, .00]
[-.00, .00]
[-.00, .00]
[-.01, .01]
[-.01, .01]
[-.00, .00]

.08
-.19*
.15*

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

450.64**
4.94
-115.75*
83.03

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[275.41, 625.87]
[-7.86, 17.73]
[-205.59, -25.91]
[-8.54, 174.60]

0.06
-0.18
0.13

[-0.09, 0.20]
[-0.33, -0.04]
[-0.01, 0.28]

(Intercept)
Impuls
RA
GA
I(Impuls * GA)
I(Impuls * RA)
I(GA * RA)

378.58*
12.83
6.60
23.89
0.08
-13.75
108.88

[78.83, 678.33]
[-10.65, 36.30]
[-334.86, 348.07]
[-335.75, 383.54]
[-25.83, 25.99]
[-39.76, 12.26]
[-75.10, 292.85]

0.15
0.01
0.04
0.00
-0.30
0.15

(Intercept)
Impuls
RA
GA
I(Impuls * GA)
I(Impuls * RA)
I(GA * RA)
I(Impuls * RA * GA)

392.27*
11.70
-19.77
-5.05
2.33
-11.58
160.22
-4.00

[42.44, 742.09]
[-16.08, 39.48]
[-505.77, 466.23]
[-527.81, 517.72]
[-36.86, 41.51]
[-50.09, 26.93]
[-536.09, 856.54]
[-56.35, 48.34]

0.13
-0.03
-0.01
0.05
-0.26
0.22
-0.08

Predictor
(Intercept)
Impuls
RA
GA

b

sr

2

Overall Model Fit
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Model Difference
95% CI
[LL, UL]

R2 = .059*
[.00, .12]

R2 = .070*
[.00, .12]

ΔR2 = .01
[-.02, .04]

R2 = .070
[.00, .12]

ΔR2 = .00
[-.00, .00]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights; beta indicates the standardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared; r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively; GA = Goal attainability; RA = Resource allocation; I = Interaction.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
The current project built upon recent studies that bridge the action-control and selfregulation literatures to explore whether state orientation relates to persistence based on goal
attainability and the need for resource allocation. Though threat-related state orientation has been
linked to prolonged activation of self-control processes, this is one of few self-regulation studies
to focus on this aspect of action control in relation to underregulation and misregulation.
Previous self-control research has focused on the demand-related state orientation subscale as a
predictor of persistence outcomes (Dang et al., 2013; Gröpel et al., 2014). However, threatrelated state orientation is thought to better predict outcomes in studies assessing persistence on
unattainable tasks (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Koole et al., 2014; Kuhl, 1981). My findings
warrant exploration into variables beyond those traditionally researched in predicting persistence
outcomes (Barber et al., 2012).
In support of previous research (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999), I found evidence that those
presented with alternative tasks (need for resource allocation) spent less time working on a task
than those only presented with that task (no need for resource allocation). However, the majority
of my hypotheses were not supported. Theories of action control suggest that state-orientation
influences persistence outcomes during frustrated goal pursuit (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Kuhl,
1981, 2000). Despite the similarity between my procedures and those used in other persistence
studies (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Gröpel et al., 2014; Kuhl, 1984; Muraven et al., 2006), I did
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not find evidence that state-orientation (threat-related nor demand-related) predicted persistence
on the first task.
I tested two potential moderators of the relationship between state-orientation and time
spent on the first task: need for resource allocation and goal attainability. I found no significant
evidence for either moderation effect. For exploratory analysis, I also tested whether trait selfcontrol, demand-related state-orientation, or optimism predicted persistence outcomes. These
traits were substituted for the threat-related state orientation measure, which was the focus of my
hypotheses. Each of the analyses replacing threat-related state-orientation with each of the
exploratory variables yielded non-significant results. Specifically, I found no evidence that
individual differences in the exploratory variables predicted time spent on the first task. I
conducted additional analyses that were not preregistered for impulsivity and restraint. I found a
significant restraint x goal attainability x resource allocation interaction. Interesting trends
emerged in the no need for resource allocation condition. Restraint was positively related to
persistence when a goal was attainable and negatively related to persistence when a goal was
unattainable.
Theoretical Implications
The current study assessed state-orientation, need for resource allocation, and goal
attainability as predictors of persistence outcomes. my results provided evidence that need for
resource allocation predicted persistence on the first task in support of self-regulation theory as
well as previous persistence research (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Barber et al., 2012; Grawitch
et al., 2010; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003). However, I did not find evidence that stateorientation predicted persistence outcomes, contrary to what was expected based on theories of
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action control and previous findings (Gröpel et al., 2014; Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Koole et al.,
2014; Kuhl, 1984, p. 198, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2008). One may argue that the manipulation
used was not strong enough to produce the expected results. However, the current study induced
threat through the use of unsolvable anagrams, a method similar to that used in preliminary
studies of action control (Kuhl, 1984). Action control theorists suggest that high negative affect
is produced during frustrated pursuit towards a goal one ought to achieve. They argue that an
unattainable goal, such as performing well on an unsolvable anagram task, would evoke
negative affect leading to single-minded goal-persistence among those high in state-orientation
(Jostmann & Koole, 2009). However, I do not have evidence that this occurred in my study.
Further research is warranted to assess the relationship between state-orientation and
persistence.
I successfully replicated the effects of Aspinwall and Richter (1999) regarding
differences in persistence in single task versus multiple task conditions. I also attempted to
replicate their results regarding the association between optimism and persistence, given that
Lench and Levine (2008) were unable to replicate these findings. I found no evidence that
optimism was associated with persistence outcomes nor did I find evidence for interaction
effects with goal attainability nor need for resource allocation in predicting persistence
outcomes. Despite my sample size being nearly double the size of the original authors’, it is still
possible that my study was underpowered to detect these effects. My results may also indicate
that optimism does not play as big of a role in predicting persistence outcomes as the current
literature suggests (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Carver et al., 2010). Further studies are
warranted to explore the relationship between optimism and persistence.
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In addition, I found no evidence that trait self-control was associated with persistence
outcomes. However, when I looked at restraint and impulsivity separately, I found evidence for
a restraint x goal attainability x need for resource allocation interaction in predicting persistence
on the first task. The simple slopes analysis suggested a significant restraint x goal attainability
interaction among those in the no need for resource allocation condition. Based on these selfregulation theories (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1998), one may assume
that those with greater self-control (restraint) would be prompted to persist more when there are
greater discrepancies between current progress and a goal. However, my results suggest that the
opposite occurred. Restraint was negatively related to persistence when a goal was unattainable
and positively related to persistence when a goal was attainable. These results corroborate
previous findings (Barber et al., 2012), which suggest that self-control is associated with greater
persistence when progress is high. Further studies may explore this association in single-task
settings to assess whether single task conditions in experiments map onto theoretical concepts
regarding persistence on a single goal.
My results warrant further exploration into the role of trait self-control in predicting
persistence in lab experiments. Previous findings call into question the relationship between
trait self-control and performance on persistence tasks (Imhoff, Schmidt, & Gerstenberg, 2014).
Failed attempts to replicated the effects of ego-depletion (Hagger et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2014)
have led to questions regarding the tasks typically used in persistence studies (Dang, 2016). The
current results warrant further exploration into the effectiveness of tasks used in the persistence
literature and the role of trait self-control in predicting theses outcomes. Given that results were
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only found with the restraint dimension of the self-control scale (Maloney et al., 2012), I
recommend that other researchers focus on restraint specifically in these contexts.

Limitations and Future Directions
There are several limitations of the current project to consider when interpreting my
results. One of these concerns how participants reacted to the tasks. my sample pool utilized far
less of the allotted time (M = 11.14 minutes) than participants in the original study (M = 19.65
minutes). This occurred despite the inclusion of three additional problems on the first task. Such
a difference could be explained by multitude of factors including differences in the samples,
methods, or analysis protocols used by the current authors and the original authors. Given the
stark differences, it may be beneficial for researchers to re-examine variables associated with
persistence outcomes such as state-orientation (Kuhl, 1981), optimism (Aspinwall & Richter,
1999), self-control (Imhoff et al., 2014), and approach motivation (Lench & Levine, 2008).
The results of my manipulation checks also merit consideration. I included manipulation
checks to test my manipulation of threat. I found that goal attainability was positively related to
competence ratings and negatively related to annoyed ratings. However, goal attainability was
not significantly related to any of the other affect variables, including anger. This may be
concerning because researchers often specify anger when discussing the link between negative
affect and single-minded goal persistence (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Jostmann & Koole,
2009; Kuhl, 2000; Lench & Levine, 2008; Levine, 1996). This may suggest that the current
design did not evoke negative affect in a manner that would prompt persistence. According to
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Jostmann and Koole (2009), an individual experiences threat when facing difficulties working
towards a goal one ought to attain. Based on the results, one may argue that the current design
did not manipulate threat, or that perceptions of threat did not differ between conditions.
Participants also may not have felt that they ought to solve the task. Perhaps future studies
could offer incentives for high performance.
One may also argue that the attainability conditions were too similar to produce
differences in the perception of threat. Unsolvable anagrams were presented in both the
unattainable condition (10/10) and the attainable condition (7/10). Though goal attainability was
significantly related to the time spent on the task, the effect was small (r = .15, p = .045). Future
studies may extend the current study by exploring whether results emerge when there is a
greater difference between attainability conditions.
In addition, neither anger nor any negative affect variable was related to time spent on the
first task. It is possible that the current design did not evoke negative affect that individuals
experience during goal frustration. Given that my results are in line with that of a similar
persistence study (Randenborgh et al., 2010), perhaps anagram-based tasks are not suitable for
inducing realistic goal-frustration. Further studies are warranted to explore the role of stateorientation in predicting persistence outcomes on tasks that more closely mirror goal-frustration
experienced in the real world.
Another potential limitation is the way in which negative affect was measured through
bipolar scales. For example, the anchors on the anger item included “peaceful” and “angry.”
Thus, low scores may be indicative of high peacefulness instead of low anger. Future studies
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may explore whether unipolar rating scales may be more suitable for assessing the experience
of negative affect.
Theories of Action control emphasize the role of affect regulation in the relationship
between state-orientation and persistence outcomes (Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Koole et al.,
2014; Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Kuhl, 2000). Thus, I explored whether state-orientation was
related to experiences of negative affect and perceptions of competence while working on the
first task. No significant relationships emerged. In addition, none of the manipulation variables
were linked to persistence outcomes. Out of all of the study variables, only resource allocation
predicted persistence on the first task.
It is difficult to assess whether my nonsignificant findings regarding individual
differences influencing persistence outcomes are related to issues with methods and procedures,
insufficient power, or whether they are indicative of true lack of relationships among variables.
It is possible that I overestimated effect sizes and recruited less participants than was necessary
to properly test my hypotheses. Issues regarding studies in the social sciences being
underpowered as well as journals selectively publishing significant results lead to highly
inflated effect size estimates in the literature and a misleading portrayal of the replicability of
findings (Brunner & Schimmack, 2016; Cohen, 1962, 1992; Francis, 2012; Ioannidis, 2008).
Future studies are warranted to explore predictors of persistence outcomes. In addition,
more replication efforts would be helpful in assessing the effects of state-orientation, optimism,
and self-control on persistence. In addition, failure to replicate key findings in the persistence
literature merit a closer examination of the effectiveness of manipulations used, as well as what
the implications of greater persistence are in these studies.
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Conclusions
The current study attempted to replicate and extend the findings of Aspinwall and Richter
in exploring differences in goal persistence based on the need for resource allocation, goal
attainability, and individual differences in action control. In line with previous research
(Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Barber et al., 2012), I found evidence that need for resource
allocation predicted persistence outcomes. My findings suggest that need for resource allocation
be considered in interpreting persistence outcomes (Barber et al., 2012; Grawitch et al., 2010).
I did not find evidence that differences in threat-related state-orientation predicted
persistence. I also did not observe any significant interactions between state-orientation and goalattainability and resource allocation in predicting persistence. No significant results were found
in any of my pre-registered exploratory analyses with demand-related state-orientation,
optimism, and self-control. I also conducted analyses with impulsivity and restraint. I found
evidence that restraint interacted with goal attainability to predict persistence outcomes when
there was no need for resource allocation. Specifically, restraint was positively related to
persistence when a goal was attainable, but was negatively related to persistence when a goal
was unattainable. This finding corroborated previous research suggesting that effective selfregulation entails disengaging when progress is low (Barber et al., 2012). More studies are
warranted to assess restraint as well as other individual difference variables that may predict
persistence outcomes.
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Recruitment Statement
Recruitment Statement/Written Consent
You are invited to participate in a study on verbal testing ability. The purpose of this study is to
understand how personality traits are associated with scores on verbal ability measures. Only
individuals who are 18 years of age or older are eligible to participate.
Your participation in this study will involve:
•
•

The completion of an online orientation session (15 min).
o Includes completion of an online survey.
The completion of a follow-up session in the laboratory (30 min).
o Includes completion of a timed test assessing verbal ability.
o

Overall, this study should take about 45 minutes to complete over the course of two sessions
(online survey session; laboratory session). For your participation, you will receive 3 points of
SONA credit for completing the entire study (1pt for completing session one, 2pts for
completing the follow-up lab session). The results of this study will remain completely
confidential and information connected to you (e.g., Z-id) will be deleted shortly after the study
is completed. Your participation may benefit society by allowing the researcher to better
understand how personality characteristics are related to verbal ability.
If you have questions about this research study, you can contact one of the principal investigators
below:
Joe Ammar, BA.
Graduate Student
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois
University
(815) 753-7158
ohsl.niu@gmail.com

Larissa Barber, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University
(815) 753-7158
ohsl.niu@gmail.com

APPENDIX B
CONSENT FORM

Study of Personality and Verbal Ability

80

You are being invited to participate in a research study conducted by Joe Ammar in the Department of
Psychology at Northern Illinois University. The purpose of the present study is to assess how personality
variables influence scores on a verbal ability measure. The results from this study will provide a better
understanding of variables that influence verbal ability.
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS: In order to participate, you must be at least 18 years of age.
PROCEDURES: Your participation in this the study will involve the completion of two sessions. The
first session will be completed online and will consist of a survey with personality questionnaires and
demographic items. The first session will take around 15-20 minutes to complete. Following completion,
you will be prompted to sign up for the second study on SONA that will be completed in the laboratory
no later than a week after the first session. During the second session, you will complete a timed test that
assesses verbal ability. This session should take no longer than 30 minutes. You will receive 1 extra credit
hours for completing the first session and 2 extra credit hours for completing the second session.
NON-PARTICIPATION STATEMENT: Your participation is voluntary and you may refuse to
participate or withdraw at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
You may also refuse to answer any question. A decision to participate or not or to withdraw your
participation will have absolutely no effect on you.
CONFIDENTIALITY: Every effort will be taken to protect your identity and keep your answers
completely confidential. Information related to your identity (e.g., Z-id) will be deleted shortly after data
collection is completed. Participation in this research is voluntary, and you are free to skip over any
questions you do not want to answer or to stop participating at any time.
PUBLICATION STATEMENT: The results of this study may be published in professional and/or
scientific journals. They may also be used for educational purposes or for professional
presentations. However, your data will be reported in the aggregate with no identifying information.
COMPENSATION: In exchange for completion of both part one and part two of this study, you will
receive 3-credits (total) to be used according to your instructor’s policy.
RISKS/DISCOMFORTS: The risks to participation are minimal. However, if survey items or test
questions make you feel uncomfortable, you may skip over them or you may discontinue the study at any
time. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a participant, you may contact the Northern
Illinois University Office of Research Compliance (815-753-8588). If you have questions about this
research study, you can contact the graduate research assistant or faculty advisor below:
Joe Ammar, BA.
Graduate Student
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University
(815) 753-7158
ohsl.niu@gmail.com

Larissa Barber, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University
(815) 753-7158
ohsl.niu@gmail.com

I confirm that I have read the consent form, am at least 18 years of age, and agree to participate in this
study.
I agree-Continue with Study
I disagree-Exit Survey/Study

APPENDIX C
ACTION-CONTROL SCALE

Directions: The following questions have two different answers. Please choose the
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answer (A or B) that applies best to you.
1.

When I have lost something valuable and can´t find it anywhere:
(

2.

( ) B) I don't dwell on it.
When I know I must finish something soon:
(

3.

) A) It feels like I am facing a big mountain that I don´t think I can climb.

( ) B) I look for a way that the problem can be approached in a suitable manner.
If I had just bought a new piece of equipment (for example, a laptop) and it accidentally
fell on the floor and was damaged beyond repair:
(

8.

) A) I can soon put losing out of my mind.

( ) B) The thought that I lost keeps running through my mind.
When I am getting ready to tackle a difficult problem:
(

7.

) A) I have trouble getting up enough energy to do anything at all.

( ) B) I quickly find something to do.
When I´m in a competition and lose every time:
(

6.

) A) It takes me a long time to get over it.

( ) B) It bothers me for a while, but then I don´t think about it anymore.
When I don´t have anything in particular to do and I am getting bored:
(

5.

) A) I have to push myself to get started.

( ) B) I find it easy to get it done and over with.
When I´ve worked for weeks on one project and then everything goes completely wrong:
(

4.

) A) I have a hard time concentrating on anything else.

) A) I would get over it quickly.

( ) B) It would take me a while to get over it.
When I have to solve a difficult problem:
( ) A) I usually get on it right away.
(

9.

10.

) B) Other things go through my mind before I can get down to working on the
problem.
When I have to talk to someone about something important and, repeatedly, can´t find
her/him at home:
(

) A) I can´t stop thinking about it, even while I´m doing something else.

(

) B) I easily forget about it until I can see the person again.

When I have to make up my mind about what I am going to do when I get some
unexpected free time:
(

) A) It takes me a while to decide what I should do.

(

) B) I can usually decide on something to do without having to think it over very much.
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11.

When I´ve bought a lot of stuff at a store and realize when I get home that I paid too much
- but I can´t get my money back:
(

12.

( ) B) I easily forget about it.
When I have work to do at home:
(

13.

18.

( ) B) I just forget about it and go do something else.
When I have to carry out an important but unpleasant task:

) A) I have trouble doing anything at all.

( ) B) I find it easy to distract myself by doing other things.
When I am facing a big project that has to be done:
(

21.

) A) I do it and get it over with.

( ) B) It can take a while before I can bring myself to do it.
When something really gets me down:
(

20.

) A) I quickly begin one thing and forget about the other.

( ) B) It´s not easy for me to put the thing that I couldn´t do out of my mind.
When something is very important to me, but I can´t seem to get it right:
( ) A) I gradually lose heart.

(
19.

) A) At first, it´s difficult for me to start doing anything else at all.

( ) B) I quickly forget about it and focus on something else.
When there are two things that I really want to do, but I can´t do both of them:
(

17.

) A) I often don´t know where to begin.

( ) B) I find it easy to make a plan and stick with it.
When I´m stuck in traffic and miss an important appointment:
(

16.

) A) I don´t let it bother me for too long.

( ) B) I feel paralyzed.
When I have a lot of important things to do:
(

15.

) A) It is often hard for me to get started.

( ) B) I usually get started right away.
When I am told that my work has been completely unsatisvariabley:
(

14.

) A) I can´t concentrate on anything else.

) A) I often spend too long thinking about where I should begin.

( ) B) I don´t have any problems getting started.
When several things go wrong on the same day:
(

) A) I don’t know how to deal with it.

(

) B) I just keep on going as though nothing had happened.
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22.

When I have a boring assignment:
(

23.

( ) B) I sometimes just can´t get moving on it.
When I have put all my effort into doing a really good job on something and the whole
thing doesn´t work out:
(

24.

) A) I usually don´t have any problem getting through it.

) A) I don´t have too much difficulty starting something else.

( ) B) I have trouble doing anything else at all.
When I have an obligation to do something that is boring and uninteresting:
(

) A) I do it and get it over with.

(

) B) It usually takes a while before I get around to doing it.

For scoring the test values, using the action-oriented answers is recommended. The sum of the
action-oriented answers for each scale is between 0 and 12.
The items are numbered from 1-24. Which items belong to which scale, and which choice
alternative is indicative of action orientation, can be found in the following key:
1.

Failure-related action orientation vs. preoccupation (AOF)
1B, 3B, 5A, 7A, 9B, 11B, 13A, 15B, 17B, 19B, 21B, 23A

2.

Decision-related action orientation vs. hesitation (SOD)
2B, 4B, 6B, 8A, 10B, 12B, 14B, 16A, 18A, 20B, 22A, 24A

APPENDIX D
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Directions: Please be as honest and accurate as you can throughout. Try not to let your response
to one statement influence your responses to other statements. There are no "correct" or
"incorrect" answers. Answer according to your own feelings, rather than how you think "most
people" would answer.
0 = I agree a lot
1 = I agree a little
2 = I neither agree nor disagree
3 = I disagree a little
4 = I disagree a lot
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
[2. It's easy for me to relax.]
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will.*
4. I'm always optimistic about my future.
[5. I enjoy my friends a lot.]
[6. It's important for me to keep busy.]
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way. *
[8. I don't get upset too easily.]
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me. *
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------Note:
Items 2, 5, 6, and 8 are fillers. Responses to “scored" items are to be coded so that high values
imply optimism. Items marked with an asterisk (*) are to be reverse coded.

APPENDIX E
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Directions: Using the scale provided, please indicate how much each of the following
statements reflects how you typically are.
1 = Not at all
2=
3=
4=
5 = Very much
1. I am good at resisting temptation.
2. I have a hard time breaking bad habits.*
3. I am lazy.*
4. I say inappropriate things.*
5. I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun.*
6. I refuse things that are bad for me.
7. I wish I had more self-discipline.*
8. People would say that I have iron self- discipline.
9. Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done.*
10. I have trouble concentrating.*
11. I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals.
12. Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is
wrong.*
13. I often act without thinking through all the alternatives.*

Reverse coded items are denoted with an asterisk (*)

APPENDIX F
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EMOTIONAL REACTIONS
Instructions: This section will refer to how you are felt DURING THE FIRST TASK. Read each
item and then select the answer that best fits the extent you felt this way during the first task.
Relaxed
Confident
Calm
Not
Irritated
Serene
Peaceful

-3
-3
-3
-3

-2
-2
-2
-2

-1
-1
-1
-1

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

Tense
Apprehensive
Anxious
Irritated

-3
-3

-2
-2

-1
-1

0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

Annoyed
Angry

COMPETENCE PERCEPTIONS
Instructions: This section will refer to your perception of the tasks. Read each item and then
select the answer that best reflects how you felt WHILE WORKING ON THE FIRST TASK.
-3
Incompetent

-2

-1

0

1

2

3
Competent

TASK SIMILARITY PERCEPTIONS
Instructions: This section will refer to your perception of the tasks. Read each item and then
select the answer that best reflects how you felt WHILE WORKING ON THE FIRST TASK.
Compared to the first task, I anticipated that tasks 2 and 3 would be…
-3
Different

-2

-1

0

1

2

3
Similar

APPENDIX G
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Instructions: Please read each question carefully and select the most accurate response.

1. Age:______years
2. Sex:

__Male

__Female

3. Ethnic Background:
__ Hispanic/Latino __
Nonhispanic
4. Racial Background:
__ White/Caucasian
__ Native American/American
Indian
__ Black/African American
__ Asian
__ Native Hawaiian/ Pacific
Islander
__ Multi-Ethnic
__ Other
5. Class Standing:
__ Freshman
__ Sophomore
__ Junior
__ Senior
6. Most recent Semester’s GPA
(Write N/A if this does not apply
to you:________)
7. ACT score: ______
8. SAT score: ______

APPENDIX H
PERSISTANCE TASK MATERIALS
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Study Anagrams
Task 1 (Attainable):
eisus (issue)
ceipr (price)
aaflt (fatal)
acelo (unsolvable)
rtean (unsolvable)
afnac (unsolvable)
filru (unsolvable)
pecit (unsolvable)
danze (unsolvable)*
lelmo (unsolvable)
haacl (unsolvable)

Task 1 (Unattainability):
oneci (unsolvable)
amoos (unsolvable)
rtean (unsolvable)
acelo (unsolvable)
rtean (unsolvable)
afnac (unsolvable)
filru (unsolvable)
pecit (unsolvable)
danze (unsolvable)*
lelmo (unsolvable)
haacl (unsolvable)

Task 2 (7 Solvable)
trypa (party)
ijnot (joint)
tlanp (plant)
cijue (juice)
torms (storm)
innou (union)
ryors (sorry)
Task 3 (7 Solvable)
mahes (shame)
divvi (vivid)
sveot (stove)
aordi (radio)
refma (frame)
etryn (entry)
aeelg (eagle)

Task 2 (7 Solvable)
trypa (party)
ijnot (joint)
tlanp (plant)
cijue (juice)
torms (storm)
innou (union)
ryors (sorry)
Task 3 (7 Solvable)
mahes (shame)
divvi (vivid)
sveot (stove)
aordi (radio)
refma (frame)
etryn (entry)
aeelg (eagle)

* Indicates items that were created for the new study.
Aspinwall, L.G., & Richter, L. (1999). Optimism and self-mastery predict more rapid
disengagement from unsolvable tasks in the presence of alternatives. Motivation and Emotion,
23, 221-245.
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Study of Personality and Verbal Ability: Debriefing Statement
Thank you for participating in this study!
We asked you to answer some questions about your thoughts and feelings pertaining to your
personality and behaviors. I also asked you to take a timed verbal abilities test. The purpose of
this investigation was to examine the relationship between variables related to persistence. The
test I administered was not truly a verbal abilities test. I manipulated the number of unsolvable
anagrams you were exposed to as well as the number of tasks you were given and measured
how long you persisted on the first task. I predicted whether differences in personality measures
and environmental variables contributed to persistence outcomes.
We would like to remind you that this is an ongoing study that will continue to run throughout
the remainder of the semester. For this reason, I ask that you DO NOT discuss the experiment
with anyone other than the researchers. In short, WHATEVER HAPPENS IN THE
LABORATORY STAYS IN THE LABORATORY. If you have more questions about the
study, please feel free to contact the primary investigator, Dr. Larissa Barber, at
lbarber@niu.edu, or Joe Ammar at jammar@niu.edu.
---------------------------------------------------------This verifies participation in PERSONALITY AND VERBAL ABILITY.
Participant is from (circle one):
PSYC102
Another psychology class
(please specify): ______
Compensation is (circle one):

Three (3)
PSYC102
Credits

Other, instructor-specified
compensation (please
specify): _______________

The date of the session was __________ and the time was _____________.
Participant Name: ________________________________________________
Experimenter Signature: ___________________________________________

